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

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From the double agent's viewpoint:

THE CASE OF MAJOR X

Hans Moses

"Now it can be told: the biggest spy story since the Alger Hiss Case. It concerns the Russian spies who were . . . TRAPPED AT THE WASHINGTON MONUMENT."

That is how Jack Anderson and Fred Blumenthal, then known as the principal associates of the late Drew Pearson, captioned a feature story published in *Parade Magazine* on 6 January 1957. Theirs was probably the most interesting of the various stories on the same topic that had begun to appear in the press some three years earlier. In January 1953, two American residents of Vienna, Austria, Kurt Ponger and Otto Verber, had been arrested on espionage charges, and Yuriy Novikov, a Soviet diplomat accredited to Washington and linked to them in the indictment, had been declared *persona non grata.* Six months after their arrest, Ponger and Verber had pleaded guilty and had been sentenced to jail. Thus there had been no need for a trial, and most of the events leading to the legal climax were never disclosed.

Anderson and Blumenthal had set out to provide part of the missing background, and, perhaps, to dispel some of the mystery. For introductory purposes, their account is worth summarizing here. They related how Ponger, once an inmate of Nazi jails, had fled in 1939 to America, where two years later he met two fellow refugees, Otto Verber and his attractive sister Vera. In World War II, both men had enlisted in the U.S. Army, where Verber rose to the rank of Second Lieutenant and Ponger to Staff Sergeant. Both had maneuvered themselves into Army intelligence assignments, and later wangled jobs as interpreters at the Nuremberg war crimes trials, where they made contact with a professional spy. In 1948, Ponger married Vera Verber, who had meanwhile worked for a red spy ring in England. Ponger opened a press agency in Vienna, and Verber helped by carrying the photographer's bag. In 1949, as *Parade* put it, Verber made one mistake: he solicited information from a U.S. Air Force officer—"Major X"—who happened to be a counter-intelligence officer.

The major's superiors instructed him to play along. This, the authors noted, was a delicate assignment: both spies had been trained by our own Army intelligence; both had served as interrogators at the war crimes trials; both had started by learning to parry questions in concentration camps. But "Major X" turned out to be their match. Ponger and Verber, masterminded by the scheming Vera, were duped into thinking he was an easy mark, and paid him in old untraceable $20 bills for carefully phonied "secret" defense documents. "Major X," meanwhile, watching the spy ring over a period of four years, discovered that Ponger and Verber were only links in a spy network that reached all the way across the Atlantic into the Soviet Embassy in the United States. He thereupon doctored some seemingly vital documents which Verber and Ponger found so

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exciting that they arranged for "Major X" to carry them personally to their contact in Washington.

Thus, on a balmy April evening in 1951,* "Major X" passed his doctored data at the Washington Monument to a mysterious Russian who turned out to be a Soviet diplomat. The scene might have been staged in Hollywood, the authors observed; but the only cameras aimed at the meeting were operated by FBI agents hidden in the vicinity. Surveillance continued for two more years. Finally, when counter-intelligence had learned enough about the spy ring, they arrested Verber and Ponger and sent the Soviet diplomat packing.

I had a far more than ordinary interest in the Anderson-Blumenthal version of the events for, unbeknownst to the authors, I was the man they had dubbed "Major X." Thus I venture to call my own reminiscences of the operation "The Case of Major X," even though I do have a name, and I have never been a major. Like Ponger and Verber, I had left Europe in the late 1930s, and during and after World War II served in the infantry and in U.S. Army intelligence. In 1949, when the story began, I was a civilian employee of an air intelligence unit of the U.S. Army, not an Air Force officer.

The *Parade* story needs correction and elaboration in many other respects, if we are to view the case as intelligence officers rather than as magazine readers. Firstly, it was *not* a matter of one man's exploits against the Soviet spy system; it was a story of teamwork on one side against teamwork on the other.

Secondly, it was not a sequence of romantic adventures. Even though it had its share of excitement for the participants, it was mainly a grim and tedious operation, with more than a fair share of disappointment and frustration, which brought me as close to a breakdown as I would ever want to come. Thirdly, it was not a story of superior planning crowned by success; it was rather a tale of trial and error, with only partial successes.

Finally, it was not an operation run under perfect conditions, thoroughly supported by all security organs, to the undimmed benefit of the nation's security interests; it was a matter of give and take, of risk and compromise, and, I think, of well-suited as well as misapplied security considerations.

This raises a number of questions, among them the following:

1. Were American personnel, including myself, properly prepared for the method of approach used by Soviet agents?

2. Was the U.S. Government sufficiently well equipped and organized for this type of operation?

3. How, if at all, could we have gained more than we did?

These and related matters have long been debated by participants in the "Major X" case, and by others who have studied and analyzed it. It has been and continues to be a useful debate. My contribution to it can be made most informatively, I believe, in the form of an abbreviated chronological review.

**Parade* evidently overlooked the fact that this date would not have allowed the aforementioned "four years" of observation.

My account of these experiences is being offered here in print for the first time. Although I have provided some comments, it is my hope that the story for the most part will speak for itself.

Background

Of the two individuals mentioned, I came to know Verber much better, but I actually met Ponger first. In November 1946, when I was aboard ship headed for Europe, Ponger was one of my co-passengers. Like myself, he had been hired as a civilian government employee. I heard from others aboard the ship that he had a distinguished combat record with the Office of Strategic Services. Only once did I have any occasion to talk to him alone. At that time, he asked me if I intended ever to return to the United States. When I expressed my surprise at such a question, he informed me that he himself would never go back. What little he owed to the United States, he said, he had paid back a hundred times. The only ties he had anywhere bound him to Austria, where his family had once owned property which he would try to recover.

This was the last talk I had with Ponger for a number of years. Should it have given me a clue as to his real state of mind? Perhaps it should have. The fact remains that it did not. It appeared to indicate no more than an odd sort of attitude.

I saw both Ponger and Verber in 1947, when I was assigned to the war crimes trials in Nuremberg where both of them worked as interrogators. Here I had no private contact with either of them, and the only observation I made was that Verber wrote good concise interrogation reports, whereas Ponger produced practically none at all. It is indeed possible, as *Parade* says, that they made contact with a professional spy there. If so, the fact is that no one seemed to know, or take notice.

My first more personal contact with Verber was made some time in 1948 in Vienna, where I had taken a civilian job with an air intelligence unit of the U.S. Army. Verber, originally a Viennese, had arrived in his old home town as a student under the G.I. Bill and, I heard, also intended to go into the news business with Ponger, his brother-in-law. Verber occupied a house in the American sector in Vienna; Ponger lived in the Soviet sector.

In the months that followed, Ponger kept very much in the background. Verber I met at first casually. After I invited him, equally casually, to look me up some time, I was surprised when late in 1948 he paid me an unscheduled visit at the office, getting past the Austrian receptionist's desk by introducing himself as an old friend of mine. I found him extremely curious about two escaped Soviet flyers who had landed in Austria. Inasmuch as the story had just been published in the Austrian press, however, his curiosity seemed explainable.

There followed a period of social contact with Verber and his wife. Nothing remarkable seemed to happen during those days. The Verbers did their level best to teach us how to play bridge, but never quite succeeded. It may be significant that he maintained this kind of contact for several months without asking for information.

First Phase: The Approach

He made a different approach, however, in June 1949, when my family and I had returned to Austria from home leave. We were sitting in Verber's garden in the beautiful Viennese sunshine, sipping cool drinks and thinking everything was all right in the world, when Verber asked to talk to me privately. Broaching the subject of anti-Semitism in general, he charged that the U.S. Government was actually engaged in furthering anti-Semitic and pro-Nazi purposes. As examples, he mentioned former Nazi technicians and scientists, who normally would have been considered war criminals, and who now were being sent under secret contracts to the United States. Informants of American intelligence agencies in many cases were also former Nazis, he said. I could help the cause of anti-Nazism if I could give him the names of such people as they might become available to me in the course of my duties.

When I asked him how someone like myself could separate Nazis from non-Nazis, he told me I could leave that to him; as long as I gave him the names, he could find the criminals. When I wanted to know what he proposed to do about them once he knew their names, Verber said he could get the Israeli government to launch official protests. He had the necessary contacts, he said.

I would like to point out here how carefully Verber adjusted his approach to what he thought were my points of vulnerability. He did not try to persuade me to work for the Soviet Union or for Communism; that evidently would not have worked. Instead, he tried to take advantage of the fact that I was a Jew, an anti-Hitlerite, and a former employee of the war crimes trials. In effect, by implying that if there was any government involved it was Israel, he was using the classic recruitment tactic of the "false flag approach."

Launching the Operation

As it happened, his judgment was not very sound. I left him with the impression that I was going to think about his proposition, and I did think about it. In fact, on the very next working day, I invited my entire office staff to help me think. At least one of them had the idea that Verber might, consciously or unconsciously, be working for the Soviet Union. Accordingly, we checked his file at the counter-subversive section that same morning. There was, we found, no information on him, but quite a bit on his brother-in-law Ponger. There was enough reason for me to make a written report of the incident. I did this with mixed feelings, and requested that I be allowed to stay away from Verber in the future.

If my request had been granted, there would be no story to tell. But after an interval of a few days, I was asked through the local CIC office to stay in touch with Verber, and report on possible subversive activities. I agreed to do what I could, especially since such an investigation seemed to have its intriguing possibilities. I then made my next appontment with Verber.

[At this point, the 1949 Cold War atmosphere in Vienna is portrayed by a senior CIA operating officer who at the time was the senior U.S. civilian air intelligence officer in Vienna, and the author's direct superior.]

The visitor to contemporary Vienna will see little tangible record beyond the Soviet Memorial in Schwarzenberg Platz of the city's most recent military occupation, nor sense anything of the atmosphere of sometimes lethal clandestine combat of the first few years following the end of military hostilities in 1945. Viewers of "The Third Man" may dismiss mention of the hazards of the "Soviet Era" of Vienna as fanciful melodramatics. But the Soviet troops, moving freely throughout the city, and in control of Europe from the Enns River far to the west, all the way to Siberia, were an inescapable reality to the Viennese. During this 1940s period in Vienna, people simply disappeared—a high police official, for example, or a government economics expert, one of the few who eventually returned after years in Soviet prisons. In those years Soviet intelligence even succeeded in recruiting two American military policemen to abduct a Western agent (although this mystery was unsolved when the case of "Major X" began—all that was known was that another Austrian has disappeared totally, without trace). "Siberia" could be a present reality in the Vienna of 1949.

Or murder. Irving Ross, for instance, who was found brutally battered to death with the jack handle of his car, late at night, in the Soviet sector of Vienna on 1 November 1948. And there were to be others.

In such an atmosphere, the risks which might be involved in embarking upon a double agent operation against Soviet intelligence were clear to all concerned, most especially to the central figure, "Major X."

I count it my good fortune to have been one of those in the author's office staff. I recall the discussion vividly still, and remember distinctly my immediate visceral feeling that Verber's pitch had the ring of authenticity. Here was no amateur proposal, but a real attempt, by what I (and all others privy to the case) assumed from the outset was Soviet intelligence, to recruit a member of the American intelligence staff in Vienna.

We had long realized, from Soviet defectors and from information gleaned through Army counter-intelligence informants, that the Soviets were actively seeking to penetrate the U.S. Headquarters in Vienna. Moreover, we were forced privately to concede the possibility that the Soviets had already managed to recruit operatives within our ranks. The wartime assignments of Lt. Verber to Army intelligence and Sgt. Ponger to OSS were in themselves examples. The decision to undertake the case took into account from the outset the consideration that the Soviets might possess a formidable cross-check capability.

Prospects for a successful double agent play were poor for other reasons, too. "Major X" was a member of the air intelligence staff, and therefore separated physically from the main Army intelligence components, G-2 and CIC, which were located in other buildings at some distance from the air staff. That air staff, however, as was well known in G-2 and CIC, was de facto *a section of G-2, responsible for evaluating specialized air intelligence information and serving requirements*

in its particular area upon all Army field collection units in Austria. That air intelligence staff comprised only four persons in 1949, when the case began. We thus faced the dilemma of persuading the Soviets, via Verber, that "Major X" had only limited access to intelligence information, all the while knowing that many members of G-2 knew or would assume that this was not in fact so.

Nor was our problem made any easier by the presence in Austria of literally scores of former civilian employees of the Nuremberg war crimes trials staff. Hired by G-2 in Austria as interrogators of the Austrian prisoners of war returning from the USSR and Yugoslavia, many of these interrogators knew Verber, Ponger, and/or "Major X," and we had no idea what the Soviets might be able to construe from even elicited remarks made innocently by former colleagues about "Major X" and his activities.

Of course, not all these hazards were clearly perceived at the outset, but they quickly became evident. Yet the decision to engage in the double agent gambit, despite all, was not unsound viewed in the perspective of the times. A vague awareness that American intelligence in Austria was a Soviet target was transformed, that April day in 1949, into a highly personal, direct, and tangible reality. One of ours had been approached by the Soviets, and was ready to use the opportunity to frustrate and negate the Soviet effort.

Throughout the overseas phase, those of us engaged in the case were constantly cognizant of the psychological stress imposed upon "Major X." The difficulties we experienced in obtaining clearance for build-up material moved some of the officers with responsibility for the case to a pessimistic estimate of its viability. Some even reached the flat conclusion that the Soviets had perceived the double play and were laying a trap. (One of the lessons I derived from this case was provided after his arrest by Verber, who stated he never had been suspicious of "Major X." What a help it was to us, at times, to have Verber actively looking for plausible excuses to explain his agent's failure to produce!)

In this atmosphere of uncertainty about the real state of the case, we countered what we regarded as a threat by a fairly sudden transfer to Salzburg, fended off with what we hoped were plausible arguments the importunings to meet "the General" in the Soviet Zone, and finally felt compelled to adopt the precipitous transfer device once again, and sent our man back to the United States in early January 1951 to avoid the physical risk to him which we felt was real.

All of this, of course, was most clearly evident to "Major X" himself. Still vivid in my memory is a telephone call I got from his wife on New Year's Day, 1951, asking me to meet her. "Major X" was even then, as our surveillance had confirmed, meeting with Ponger. She handed me the gun we had provided him, and explained that he had told her, in essence, that he was not afraid to meet Verber or Ponger, but was afraid to carry the gun, lest one of them somehow notice it and draw the proper inference.

To me, thus, the point is clear. This was a successful counter-espionage case, which achieved the goals of exposing its Soviet intelligence backing and neutralizing the Soviet agents directly involved. There were many, many people involved in the support and, at times, non-support of the operation, but its success was the work of one man: "Major X."

Early Stages

After having gotten my apparent agreement to work with him, Verber expressed great interest in having a "fundamental talk" with me, which would show him what kind of information I could get, and would enable him to ask me "more intelligent" questions. When the first meeting in my house was in prospect, I decided, rather than to depend on my own eyes and ears alone, to ask for the installation of listening devices. My quarters were not exactly designed for that sort of thing; we lived on the top floor of a six-family house, and had only Austrian neighbors, among them a very curious housekeeper. The maid happened to be on vacation, however, and her room could be used. In it we locked a CIC agent, a secretary, and an enlisted man who ran a huge tape recorder. I maneuvered Verber onto a sofa with a microphone taped behind it, and he talked quite freely about what he wanted me to do. His requirements this time included one for names of employees of American intelligence agencies. The meeting lasted for several hours. Verber was so absorbed that he did not notice the noise when the microphone fell to the floor, and he paid no attention to my badly disguised attempts to enunciate my words carefully. That effort was to no avail, anyhow, because the recorder failed to operate.

After that, Verber and I had frequent meetings, most of them with a social flavor. We usually just separated from our wives, and conducted our business in a "private" room in one of our houses. At my home, listening devices were used regularly. On some occasions a photographer was placed on the back porch, where he could take pictures of Verber and myself. There was even a proposal to install a two-way mirror in the wall—something to which I objected as I did not know how I could explain the hole in the wall to outsiders. As time went on, my wife became quite unhappy at the interference with her privacy, and the need to keep the children and the maid out of the way at specified times. Finally, when we were asked to transform our maid's room into a permanently equipped observation post, she put her foot down, and government affairs had to move outside.

Security

During the first phase of the case, security precautions were somewhat problematic. As I noted earlier, a fairly large number of people, including my entire office staff, knew of the beginning of the operation. With a great deal of enthusiasm and, for my part, all the blessings and afflictions of inexperience, we made arrangements and decisions. A special problem was created for me by the people who knew both Verber and myself, as I had to ask myself in every case whether or not they could be trusted, whether they were in a position to know anything that would give me away, and to what extent I should treat each of them as a friend or a potential enemy. I sometimes compromised by

warning people to be careful with Verber and Ponger, without telling them about the operation. Fortunately, not too many people knew both sides well enough to cause real difficulty.

Objectives and Methods

As for the objectives in the case, they were largely self-conceived in the early stages. I determined my approach to Verber before each meeting, and displayed the attitude which I thought would be best suited to gain his confidence and at the same time attain results. We wanted to prove, first, that Verber actually was a foreign agent, find out which country he was working for, and discover the contacts he had and the operating methods he used. In order to break his story of Israeli connections, I pretended to be just as dissatisfied with the state of the world as he was, but indicated that Israel, to me, just was not the right solution. I thus displayed an ideological vacuum which I asked Verber to help me fill. In general, when he offered opinions or made requests, I tried to appear receptive but not too bright, and usually willing but not always able. Above all, I did my best to display a consistent attitude and have an explanation for everything I did, just in case it was observed.

Information to be passed to Verber was cleared for me through the CIC. As weeks turned into months, Verber wanted to know more and more. I had to help myself by pretending to get information from outside the office where I could not follow it up, and by describing my activities in the office as very limited, which made it impossible for me to observe too much. One of the subjects of his inquisitiveness was the Central Intelligence Agency. He tried to find out who was representing it in Vienna, and what it did. I am afraid that I was not of much help to him there.

Considering how little guidance we had during this first phase, our efforts seemed to have splendid results. Verber appeared to believe that he was leading me on, and came somewhat closer to admitting his Soviet sympathies. I even induced him to admit, to the benefit of a secret tape recording, that in case of a war he would prefer to fight for the Soviet Union.

Second Phase: Commitment

Our own plans now became somewhat more ambitious. I was asked through intelligence channels whether I would consent to become a long-range double agent, or whether—in view of the danger to my family and myself—I wished to be excused. If I would go along, I was told, this would mean that the operation would become the foremost thing in my life, and that in effect I would have to eat, drink, and sleep with it. In return for this service, I was informed, I could virtually set my own conditions. What followed was very simple: I accepted, and made no conditions whatsoever.

The working set-up now became more systematic, and security restrictions were tightened considerably. I could no longer discuss the progress of the case with just anyone in my office which, at times, was a bit uncomfortable. I also received more direct guidance on what I was supposed to accomplish, and how this was supposed to be done. The operation was divided into prospective phases: I was supposed to establish myself progressively more firmly in a spy

system which by now we all assumed to be Soviet; eventually, the operation was supposed to be transferred to Washington; and in the hoped-for final stage, was to be used to feed the Soviets false information.

Initiatives and Problems

One of the first requests I had to make under the new program was this: I had to ask Verber for money—a $5,000 bank account. When Verber declined, the request was changed to one for a monthly salary of $50. After some apparent hesitation, Verber seemed happy to comply. Altogether I collected about $300 from him in Vienna. He now needed a code name for me for use on his vouchers, so he called me, of all things, "Lindbergh,"—probably because I had once reported to him having met Charles Lindbergh at an air base in Bavaria. Verber continually admonished me not to take the money too lightly, because it not only was a token of appreciation, but also represented the earnings of working people. (For the time being, however, he still refused to tell me who his actual sponsors were.)

While Verber's pressure for information was still remarkably light after the first payment, it soon grew much more intense. We often did our talking in one of our cars, and I quite often carried listening devices in the car or on my person. My meetings sometimes led me into the Soviet sector, and once or twice to Ponger's home. In order to realize how uncomfortable that was, one must know that Ponger's place was practically surrounded by Soviet intelligence installations. Several times Verber came to my house before breakfast, offered to drive me to work, and talked business on the way.

How to remain in good standing with him without jeopardizing valuable information now became a major problem. I was thinking practically night and day of what information I could give him, how I could present it without inviting further questions which I would be unable to answer, how to explain things about which I could not tell him the real story, and how to keep myself from withholding information which he might know I had. The passing of some genuine intelligence data could not be avoided. While he never received any information which was really valuable, he was given enough to keep him interested. I preferred to provide him with data which looked more significant than they were. I also now told him, upon the advice of my superiors, that I hoped eventually to get an intelligence job in Washington. This, as much as anything else, probably served to keep his interest alive.

The Lighter Side

This period was not without its amusing incidents. Verber once invited my wife and me to a masquerade party in the Soviet sector. We shared a table with the Verbers, the Pongers, and various other people. Naturally, the CIC showed up in force; this was a splendid chance to observe, protect, and have fun all at the same time, especially since one could wear a mask and avoid being recognized. Ponger had his camera, and I, not wearing a mask, was one of his very favored focal objects. Occasionally strangers came to the table, seemingly reporting to Ponger, who reminded me of Napoleon talking to his troops. One of the CIC men—now a senior CIA official—later told me that

he once came close enough to hear me whistle "the Battle Hymn of the Republic," thought I might be giving him a signal, and wondered whether he should call a general alarm. Luckily he decided against it; far from giving him a signal, I did not even recognize him.

When Verber took us back in his car, I told him it had been a very nice affair. "It must have been," he said. "Half the CIC was there."

I can chuckle now about another incident which at the time didn't seem funny at all. When we were about to move from our apartment to a different place in the neighborhood, I removed the hidden listening devices and wiring, put them in a briefcase, and took a cab to a safehouse, expecting to turn the equipment over to a CIC officer. On my way upstairs, I suddenly realized that I had left the briefcase in the cab. I ran back down again and after some jogging through the streets, ran my cab down at a nearby stand. When the driver saw me coming, he recovered the briefcase from the rear seat. "You didn't have to worry," he said soothingly as he handed it to me. "I would merely have turned it over to the police." I think my heart skipped a beat.

Pressure

We soon reached the stage where, in order to make progress, I was supposed to attempt to establish a new contact in hopes of uncovering another link in Verber's network. I told Verber that I had found some derogatory information on him and his brother-in-law in the CIC files and could no longer afford to be seen with him. Taken aback, Verber promised a new contact, but apparently was induced later to change his mind. Inasmuch as I refused to give him any more information under the prevailing circumstances, but he continued to try to see me, we had an increasing number of arguments. In one instance, I reached the point of offering to return the money he had given me, which caused Verber to hint darkly that I could never extricate myself from my alliance with him.

While I tried to give Verber the impression that I was getting quite impatient with him, he himself displayed signs of growing impatience. My wife now often heard the telephone ring, but heard no voice when she tried to answer. As the pressure was so obviously increasing, our authorities became apprehensive that it might lead to a kidnapping attempt against me or a member of my family.

Exit from Vienna; Operating in Salzburg

It was thought best, therefore, that we move to Salzburg in the American Zone of Austria. In order to cover the real purpose of the move, it was decided to transfer my entire unit. A somewhat comical note was injected into the proceedings when one of my unit chiefs tried to exclude my particular branch from the unit transfer because he thought my branch could operate more efficiently in Vienna. He was overruled.

The move to Salzburg was apparently accomplished without making Verber unduly suspicious. He continued to visit me, and I continued to refuse to tell him anything, although I offered to accept his requirements for the day that a new contact would appear. Verber obliged by asking me questions. The greatest headache for our side was caused by his query regarding American evacuation

plans from Austria, especially as parts of such a plan were then being developed in my office.

The plan was TOP SECRET, and I never told Verber about it, although I had the remarkable experience, before I left Europe, of seeing it published in an English-language newspaper. Indirectly, however, the request for evacuation plans was responsible for making me wish to leave the scene. All married American personnel had received a pamphlet, classified RESTRICTED, telling them what to do and where to report if evacuation became necessary. The fact that these instructions had been distributed to all personnel involved was stated in the pamphlet, and so I could see no safe way of maintaining to Verber that I did not have them. Someone in the local American headquarters, however, decided that we could not afford to disclose such information, intentionally or otherwise, and refused to clear it for passage. My reaction was that in that case, security considerations made it impossible for me to carry on a successful operation overseas. My superiors agreed, and as it was just about time to take another step anyhow, we prepared my transfer to Washington.

Climactic Meetings

When I notified Verber in writing that the Washington goal was in sight, it took him a while to answer. When he did, it was with an urgent plea for me to come to Vienna and talk to "the boss." I was half-tempted to go, but my superiors concluded that I had a poor chance of returning from such a trip, and did not let me undertake it. Eventually, Verber contacted me in Salzburg, apparently after spending the night outside my house in order not to miss me, and proposed that I cross the zonal border with him at an illegal crossing point. He said he wanted to introduce me to "the boss," a Soviet general who had arrived in response to a telegram Verber had sent to Moscow. I had to refuse. Similarly I refused to see Ponger, which he proposed as an alternative.

On our side, the significance of that meeting was debated practically all night. It was the first time that Verber had literally admitted Soviet connections. The prevailing opinion seemed to be that there was neither a Soviet general nor a case, that we had been compromised, and that my proposed trip was intended to be a one-way affair. It was proposed that I meet Verber the next day, hand him some documents, and help in arresting him. I successfully resisted that solution. I felt that the Soviets had ample reason for wanting to test me, but I did not believe that they were ready to give up on me just yet.

As it turned out, the next day Verber agreed to prepare me for my future career in the United States without the benefit of a trip across the border. In response, I gave him some information, notably personnel and organizational data which had been specially cleared for the occasion—the first information he had received in months. Verber questioned me in detail on some of the people I mentioned, especially on their susceptibility to drink and women, and on possible homosexual tendencies. Finally, he asked me to give him a handwritten list of groceries. If someone should present that list to me in the United States, I would know that person would be my contact.

This, however, did not stand up. On New Year's Day in 1951, Verber returned, cancelled his arrangements, and insisted I see Ponger, who alone was

entitled to prepare me for stateside operations. (He asked me not to mention his own previous provisions to his brother-in-law.) This time I agreed to meet Ponger.

He had his own plan all prepared. He gave me $300 "to help with resettlement" in the United States, and told me that I was now a "comrade" working for the people of the Soviet Union. He made me write a letter to the "general" who would be my future contact, and whom I had offended by not coming to Vienna—a ploy undoubtedly designed to compromise me should I ever try to escape from my "comradeship." He admonished me to act like a patriotic American, and to avoid criticizing the United States.

Again I had to write a note, this time purporting to introduce a "Mr. Williams" as "Lindbergh's" friend, which my future contact would use to identify himself. At 8 p.m. on the second Tuesday in April 1951, I was supposed to wait for "Mr. Williams" at the Washington Monument, wearing, among several items, a piece of adhesive tape around one finger of one hand, and carrying a red-covered book under the other arm. I had to memorize several code questions and answers, which had to precede any further discussion with my contact. Ponger also made a series of alternative arrangements, leaving nothing to chance.

I had just one more short meeting with Verber, during which he told me that he hoped we would see each other again in a "more decent" United States. This was the last time I saw either him or Ponger before they were sentenced to jail.

Homeward Bound

A few days after my last meeting with Verber, my family and I were homeward bound. All of us were extremely happy, even if our feelings were not based on identical reasons. We were all looking forward to a more normal life, of course. While the children did not realize the danger that had threatened us for more than 18 months, they seemed to feel as much relief at the change in atmosphere as their parents did. I myself, however, was thinking primarily of a resumption of the case. True, there had been frustrations, arguments, and disappointments, and I had not always had the weapons I thought were needed for a successful fight. It seemed to me, for example, that there was rarely as much information provided and cleared for passage to Verber as I would have liked to ease the task of establishing my "usefulness" to the Soviets. It is probably true that in these cases the agent is under psychological pressure to give the appearance of "producing," while his handlers are primarily under similar counter-pressures to see to it that nothing of any great value is passed. Be that as it may, in retrospect I recall that frequently during the overseas phase, and even more often stateside, I felt I was not being given enough material to grease the wheels of the operation in a satisfactory manner.

Yet I proudly told myself that the fight, after all, had been successful up to this point. The cover had been removed from some of our hidden enemies; the finger had been pointed at others, who might in time be identified; and countless clues had been provided for those who studied the methods of enemy penetration. Above all, I had met the challenge to "eat, drink, and sleep" with the case, and had become a long-range double agent, ready for further assign-

ments. The generally splendid support I had received overseas from so many individuals left me no doubt that I had embarked on the most important venture of my life. The continued success of the operation had become an intensely personal matter; I had given it all I had, felt it was more worthwhile than anything else I would ever want to do, and was anxious to pursue it in the United States. Paradoxically, perhaps, I also felt relief when I thought that I would first have some time to catch my breath—at least until the second Tuesday in April.

Stateside Reception

Two days after our arrival in New York, I reported to an office in the Pentagon which, I was told overseas, would give me further instructions. Here I met a number of G-2 personnel who, I was informed, had been directing the operation from the Washington end. I also met some people with whom I had been associated overseas, in one case a tearful reunion.

The schedule for that day included a discussion of certain facets of the overseas operation and a clarification of my own future. I was told that I now was a free agent, but that the way would be cleared for me if I was willing to resume my double agent's role. In the latter case, I would be introduced to an agent of the FBI, which was prepared to take charge of the operation, and to the Air Force general in whose division I was supposed to work. I reaffirmed my willingness to pursue the case further.

I was also offered reimbursement for any expenses I might have incurred while returning to the United States, but I had no reason to accept and did not.

The FBI agent arrived in the afternoon. I pointed out to him and to the G-2 representatives that I had felt the overseas operation in its later stages had been hamstrung by lack of information available for passing to my contact, and asked for assurances that I would not have to work under a similar handicap in the United States. I was informed—it may have been in a subsequent meeting, and it is possible that the assurance came from the G-2 side—that the difficulty would be largely eliminated with the compilation of a backlog of information to which the interested agencies were expected to contribute. It was also indicated that once in a while, in addition to this backlog, enough current information could be cleared for release, even if the interested organs should have to apply some pressure on the clearing board. I was satisfied, and made an appointment with the FBI agent for further discussions a few days later.

In the late afternoon, I met my prospective Air Force employers. My assignment was about what I had been led to expect, but my rating was somewhat below expectation. The G-2 officer who had introduced me to the Air Force officials agreed that it was disappointing, but advised me to take up such problems with the FBI.

First Operational Talks

I met my FBI contact, in accordance with his instructions, in front of a Washington drug store. After a few maneuvers designed to make sure that I had not been followed, we drove through the Virginia countryside and had our first conference. Among other things, I wanted to know how I could settle future

questions about inconvenience and costs arising from operational requirements, and pointed out that I had been advised to discuss such matters with the FBI. The answer was straightforward enough. At the present time, I was told, the Bureau could do very little for me, because we were not as yet engaged in an operation. The overseas case was a thing of the past; and a new operation, in which the FBI would be interested, would begin only if and when I would meet a Soviet contact in the United States. In that case, I would have information to offer, and I could get paid for it; before that, the Bureau could not very well be responsible for a case which it did not have.

I objected vigorously. I simply wanted to be protected against mishap or disadvantage. Right now, I pointed out, I was expected to stake my entire future on a case in which the FBI at this point refused to have much of a stake and which, if the Bureau's contention was correct, did not even exist.

The FBI man was unimpressed. It was up to me, he stated, whether or not I wanted to do the job. He reminded me, however, that I had certain responsibilities as a citizen of the United States, a fact which he thought might influence my decision.

My own feeling was, of course, that I had made my decision, and I wasn't about to change it. It seemed strange, however, that after my work overseas I should once again be reminded of *my* responsibilities, but that corresponding responsibilities on anyone else's part were hard for me to detect at that precise moment.

Getting Ready

I had accumulated quite a bit of leave overseas, so now I spent some time with my family. I fitted practically everything I did, however, into the framework of my counter-espionage operation. As Verber had been told that the deteriorating health of an aging relative was the reason for our going home, I thought it best to spend some time with the relative in Philadelphia. Whenever I went to Washington to talk to the FBI agent, I made sure to visit the Pentagon as well, in order to have a logical explanation for each trip for the benefit of possible Soviet observers. I never talked to a stranger without adapting my words to the possibility that he might be a Soviet agent or might later be contacted by the Soviets.

When talking to Verber and Ponger overseas, I had presented my assignment to Washington as a certainty. It seemed logical for me to settle in the Washington area before I had the first appointment with the new Soviet contact, even if I had not actually started working. We moved to Falls Church in March 1951. I had agreed with the office that I would be on the job by the middle of April, and had later been asked to come in on 20 April. At least I had a definite date I could mention to my prospective Soviet contact who, it will be remembered, was to meet me at the Washington Monument on 12 April.

At the Washington Monument

I was a few minutes late for my 8 p.m. meeting on 12 April. Carefully following all the instructions I had received from Ponger. I came equipped with adhesive-taped finger and red-covered book, and had memorized the prescribed

questions and answers. I knew, of course, that FBI agents were covering the meeting, but I had been told that they would stay at a respectable distance.

It was getting fairly dark when I approached the Monument, and I couldn't help thinking how silly it was to carry a book at a time like that. Soon I distinguished the figure of a man in a dark suit, who appeared to be the only other visitor. After I had walked around the Monument, he stopped me and asked me the questions I had been expecting: Was the National Gallery still open? Did I know the way to the White House? I gave my own prepared answers, and then waited for him to produce a piece of paper. Even in the uncertain light, I could recognize my own handwriting. "I am Mr. Williams," the man said in a guttural accent, quite superfluously.

"Mr. Williams" turned out to be extremely friendly, and obviously very happy to have met me. In guiding me away from the Monument, which he characterized as a "very bad meeting place," he patted me on the back and managed to touch various parts of my rearward anatomy, until I was sure he had inconspicuously frisked every inch down to the waistline. After that, he seemed interested in making the meeting as short as possible. I managed to tell him what my job situation was, and he found time for a few reassuring words. After that, he made arrangements for the next meeting, which was, as I recall, to take place in nearby Maryland a week or so later. At that time, he indicated, we could settle some of my "problems." Then he left after making sure that I did not go in the same direction.

Walking back to my car, I was somewhat excited, but not surprised at what had just taken place. I had assumed that the operation would follow me to the United States, and it had.

Identification

Later that evening I met a number of FBI agents who now, of course, were willing to drop some of their earlier reservations. My description of the new contact—about 30 years old, weighing about 200 pounds, with dark hair, round face, horn-rimmed glasses, and speaking with a guttural accent—seemed to fit someone they knew, although they could not be sure. At the FBI Field Office, I examined picture after picture. Finally I pointed to one showing a man walking in front of a building. This time there was no doubt. The man with whom Ponger had placed me in contact was Yuriy V. Novikov, Second Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C.

The FBI agent in charge of the case took me home after midnight. The case had indeed begun, he said; the Bureau valued my services and was willing to pay for them. I declined. Although the FBI would undoubtedly not have seen it in the same light, it still would have given me the feeling that my services were for sale. The information I obtained as the by-product of a penetration attempt directed against the enemies of the United States was not a commercial item, to be paid for upon delivery.

Job Problem

If my contact with a Soviet official in Washington was, as it seemed to me, a tremendous thing, I failed to feel its effect in my relationship with the Air

Force. As agreed, I started to work on about 20 April, although I was not scheduled to go on the payroll until 1 May. Just prior to 1 May, moreover, I received word that I had not been properly processed, had not been cleared, and could not be allowed to work in the designated office until my papers had properly gone through channels. This was supposed to take a maximum of three weeks—and it took exactly that. In the meantime, my available cash had dwindled to almost nothing, and all my earthly possessions were tied up in what I had come to regard as the "Washington venture." At that time, I entertained serious doubts that the Air Force would honor its commitment to employ me, or that I had enough time to wait for the decision. I attempted and failed to find suitable short-term employment outside the government, and wondered how I would have explained an outside job to my Soviet contact without making him lose interest in me.

For the second and third weeks of May, fortunately, my anticipated Air Force salary was paid by the FBI. On 20 May, the Air Force finally opened its doors. I still had not been cleared, and my rating had been cut yet another notch, but it was a starting point.

Next Meetings

My next meetings with my Soviet contact were quite different from anything I had experienced overseas. He seemed to be interested mainly in avoiding possible surveillance. He never talked to me at the location where we met, and refused to talk in the car. Usually he drove me around for as long as an hour, going through a park, crossing main streets, suddenly stopping and reversing himself, and all the time watching for other vehicles. When he seemed to be satisfied that no one had followed him, he parked in a spot quite distant from our meeting place, and we both got out of the car and discussed our business while walking or standing out in the open. Afterward, he sometimes drove me to the vicinity of my own car, but more often told me to take a cab. He always gave me the time and location of the next meeting before we started on the return trip, and also made careful arrangements for alternative meetings if we should happen to miss each other. I usually wrote the details down, but could never induce him to give me a sample of his handwriting.

Subject of Meetings

Novikov was as systematic in his approach toward my exploitation as he was in his anti-surveillance precautions. Right at the beginning, he informed me that he wanted to proceed "scientifically." First, he questioned me on my personal history and background, then on my associates in the office, and finally on my capability to provide information.

One of the first things I got cleared for him was my job description, which stated, truthfully, that I was working on general interrogation requirements as well as specific requirements on installations in the Soviet Union. Novikov immediately pounced on the latter and asked for as many details as possible. Unfortunately, it was subsequently decided that I could not give him such information, and I had to figure out a very intricate retreat, involving a change in my job description and a rearrangement of the functions attributed to other office personnel.

Otherwise I had hardly any information for him at first. The fact that I had not been cleared served as a temporary explanation, although it was somewhat difficult getting through a meeting with the pretense that I knew absolutely nothing. Novikov, however, was surprisingly patient, and even counseled me to be patient too. He provided me with several hundred dollars, which, as always, I immediately turned over to the FBI, and told me to be careful, as the time element was less important than the necessity for me to gain the confidence of my associates.

I thus helped myself over the dismal present by making implied promises for a more productive future. At the same time, I tried to get Novikov to give some requirements, and to reveal something about himself and his superiors; I thought it would be in character for me to be curious about those things. Novikov, however, would only tell me that I was working for the benefit of the Soviet Union, and that information of interest to the USSR was more important to him than data pertaining to satellite countries. He advised me to use my own intelligence in determining what information would be of interest to the USSR. Beyond that, he never revealed anything—not even his own identity.

Clearance Procedures

In the early days, my official contact regarding all phases of the operation was confined to the FBI. After I had stalled Novikov for a while, I kept asking for the backlog of information which I thought I was supposed to receive. I was told that there was some delay, and that in the meantime I should collect the information myself and hand it to the FBI agent, who would hand it to the clearing body, which would pass it back to the FBI agent, who could then return the cleared items to me.

For some time, that was actually the way it worked. As I had not yet received my clearance papers, however, I did not have a chance to do much collecting. I could merely use some items which I had accidentally seen or overheard, and I hated myself for handing them in. More to the point, that type of information was neither voluminous nor significant enough to satisfy my contact, especially because a fairly high percentage usually failed to get cleared.

It was, I felt, an impossible situation. At one time, I asked the FBI whether it would not be better to have me transferred to a different agency, preferably G-2, where better working arrangements might be obtained. (I actually prepared Novikov for a potential change to a "different intelligence agency," whereupon he solicitously asked if, perhaps, I meant the Central Intelligence Agency.)

Finally, after some additional pressure, the Air Force came through with my full clearance for the job, which helped the case as well as my morale. I had to continue to collect my own information, however, and have it cleared by the somewhat cumbersome procedure I outlined earlier. Usually I got my items back so shortly before I was scheduled to meet Novikov that there seemed to me to be too little time to clear up debatable points, weave the items into a fitting cover story, and make my way to the meeting place. In addition, items once cleared were occasionally withdrawn later. I was also told to volunteer nothing and to give as little as possible, but instead to get Novikov to tell me what *he* wanted.

My FBI contacts in those days gave me the impression that they appreciated my difficulties, but could do little about them. After all, the FBI also had to wait for the items to be cleared. I was encouraged to do the best I could with what I had. In retrospect, I can appreciate that my view of the goals of the operation at that time may not have coincided with the concepts of those who were setting the policy. At any rate, eventually I wrote a memorandum, pointing out what I thought were the flaws in the working set-up, expressing my conviction that they were endangering the operation, and making several concrete proposals, including one for direct contact between me and the responsible organs of the Air Force. The memorandum was directed to, and evidently vigorously supported by, the FBI. A short time later, I was called into a joint conference of Air Force and FBI representatives. From then on, I had my own Air Force case officers, two senior colonels, whose efforts in my behalf and in behalf of the operation I came to appreciate, especially when it became evident to me that they were working with very limited resources.

Policy

To me, the purpose of the operation had seemed quite clear overseas, but it was less clear in the United States. I knew, of course, that Novikov's identification had been useful to the FBI, and that the operation could help them to identify some of his associates. I received no explicit guidance, however, as to the type of information I was supposed to provide, or what I was supposed to accomplish with it. Later, I heard that there was a policy to keep the case going with a minimum of information. (This would be in keeping, of course, with a goal of simply keeping the fish in play for further identification purposes, but would hardly achieve what I had understood to be the ultimate aim: deception. This may well explain the discrepancy between how much information I got, and how much I felt was needed.) Otherwise, I knew only that I was supposed to collect evidence, and get as much money from Novikov as possible. I tried my best to do what I was asked, but did not derive much inspiration from it, and at times found it difficult to maintain a strong sense of direction.

Relaxation

Novikov, in the meantime, seemed to lose some of his extreme apprehensiveness. My FBI associates told me that he sometimes no longer investigated the meeting place prior to my arrival, although that had been a regular habit of his. His trips through the countryside with me before settling down for our conferences became shorter and more relaxed, and the FBI was occasionally able to keep up with us. We often had our talks in restaurants or other public places, rather than in the open, and Novikov invariably ordered a sumptuous meal for both of us and tipped generously. If the information I gave him was less than adequate, I never ceased to impress him with my anxiety to do "better work" in the future; and if I once again used my battle-tested story of being wary of security regulations, Novikov at that time agreed that it was wise to be careful.

Novikov's relaxation was a great help in the FBI's efforts to gather evidence. It now was possible for me to steer him past designated points where he could be easily identified. Often I drove him around in my car, where he left a generous supply of fingerprints. Inasmuch as my car was equipped with listening

devices, it was sometimes possible for the FBI to hear his voice, although he still did not do much talking during the ride. Once, he even made an appointment with me in front of a theater in broad daylight, where he, one of his associates, and I could be filmed meeting each other. My elation over this accomplishment, however, was dimmed by the inability of the FBI agent in charge to get permission for me to see the film. At the beginning of the case, I had felt like a participant in the investigative machinery; now, I thought at the time, I was accepted as no more than an informant.

Information and Requirements

Most meetings started out simply with Novikov asking me what I had for him. I would then tell him what I had allegedly heard or observed, and, if required, how I had heard or observed it. I often took my cue from handwritten notes, undecipherable to anyone save myself, in which I had connected isolated scraps of information, often in order to give them an artificial significance. I could not make my information more important than it was; but I tried my best to make it appear important to the man in front of me. For some time, I apparently succeeded.

As was inevitable, Novikov one day asked me to tell him exactly what I did in the office, to what information I had access, what my associates did, and how documents were routed and processed. Luckily, he gave me a few weeks in which to provide the answer. I drew up a semi-fictitious paper, replete with non-existant compartmentation and security restrictions, and handed it in for clearance. It was cleared without change, including a statement that I had access to certain Army, Air Force, and CIA reports. Characteristically, Novikov immediately seized on the subject of CIA reports in preference to everything else, and asked me to pay special attention to subject matter and sources of information. Later I was informed that information on CIA reports was not clearable after all, and that I would have to extricate myself from the statement I had made to Novikov. This situation created one of the severest headaches I had yet experienced. I finally did figure out a solution which, I thought, might be both feasible and in character, but which is too complicated to be set down here. I was, however, beginning to feel that my main task in the case was that of devising excuses for Novikov.

Among Novikov's requirements, of which I finally got a few, was one for information on Western countries, which, of course, I denied having or being able to get. I also remember that he asked for a Justice Department telephone book, but was not interested in the Pentagon directory. In some instances, he tried to follow up scraps of information which I had given him. Notably, he did this in the case of a vague statement of mine to the effect that it was planned to use Soviet emigrés for intelligence purposes overseas. More surprisingly, he also tried to follow up an item on a proposed change in the U.S. air attaché staff in Argentina. In almost all instances, I pretended to have obtained the information in such a way that further news on the same subject was uncertain. My item-by-item clearance procedure made it impossible for me to use a more systematic approach.

Novikov still seemed to be convinced of my good faith. At least he kept on paying money in multiples of $100. One day, he even asked me to recommend

other personnel who might be susceptible to a Soviet approach, saying that I myself would not be required to do the approaching. We never got to the point, however, of taking advantage of the offer.

Pressure

Signs of pressure on Novikov's part began to appear when the stateside operation was nearly a year old and—as far as benefit to the USSR was concerned—had produced absolutely nothing. He pointed this out to me one day. Conceding that the shortcomings might be at least partly his fault, because he might have omitted some of the things I had reported, he nevertheless pointed out that the results were not satisfactory. While he appreciated my desire to remain uncompromised, he had to make me realize that our meetings entailed considerable risk for both of us—a risk which did not seem justified by the present product of our arrangement. My reaction was one of feigned indignation. I told him that our relationship was meant to be profitable for him, not for me, and that I was ready to break it off if he did not properly appreciate it. Novikov, somewhat flustered, agreed that everything would work out.

He tried by various means to increase my "productivity." Once he told me that I could earn "a lot of money" with the right kind of work, and asked me to think of a good way to camouflage large earnings. His interim solution, as it eventually developed, provided for fewer personal meetings and a sort of mail-drop system. I was instructed to buy a typewriter, for which he furnished the money. Such items as he would be interested in were to be typed in my home, enclosed in a tin can, and dropped in a designated place, where they would be picked up at specified times. Novikov contended that the system was practically foolproof, as no one could be caught giving or taking classified information, and indicated that tin cans had been used before.

After some hesitation, I agreed to try his "system." We actually had a dry run. I placed a folded piece of newspaper in a tin can, flattened the can, and deposited it under a designated shack in Glencarlyn Park in Virginia. Although no one was observed removing the can as far as I know, it was gone several days later, and during our next meeting Novikov ironically thanked me for the newspaper.

Interruption

I had informed the FBI and the Air Force, of course, that Novikov was apparently under pressure to make the operation more productive and less risky. It was decided that I would have to go along with the mail-drop proposition for the time being. My request for more impressive information was answered with the clearance of a larger number of items than I normally had, but they were hardly more impressive.

The next meeting with Novikov took place around March 1952. After I had given him the information and told him I was willing to work with typewriter and tin cans, he surprised me by saying that the new program would have to be postponed. He would be out of town at the time when we would normally have our next face-to-face meeting, and that too would have to be postponed for more than a month. He did, however, set a definite date for the next meeting,

and gave me exact instructions for alternative arrangements. Provisions previously made for an emergency meeting, which I was to call if I had something particularly important to report, were reaffirmed. Novikov assured me, however, that he saw no reason why the intended meeting should not take place as scheduled. In his customary surreptitious way, he put $400 into the pocket of my overcoat, which was hanging on a rack. It was the largest single sum I had ever received from him, and brought the total up to about $2,000.

My first feeling after that meeting was one of relief. For some time, I had felt that the preparation for my meetings, climaxed by the meetings themselves, was more of a strain on my nerves than I could continually impose upon myself. Not only had my family started to suffer under my badly frayed disposition, but I was beginning to suspect that I was reaching a point where I could not go on trying to fashion successful meetings out of the morsels I had to dig up under the "minimum of information" policy. In addition to that, I had begun to wonder what would happen to my family and myself if the emotional strain should result in an impairment of my health. On that point, I had no reassurances whatever from anybody. I was happy, therefore, that Novikov intended to stay away from me for a while.

Last Meeting

I knew that Novikov's "out-of-town" trip had taken him all the way back to his own country. He had not yet returned when we were supposed to get together again; in fact, he failed to appear at several alternative meetings. Although he had never failed to show up before, we remained hopeful.

Our "permanent" meeting place was in Anacostia at the corner of 30th and R Streets SE, and the schedule called for me to be there every second Tuesday if other appointments had failed to materialize. One Tuesday—I believe it was early in June—I saw Novikov again. He shook my hand, and I had time to tell him that I was very anxious to talk to him. He told me to drive slowly along the street while he walked beside the car. As I drove around a corner and he dropped back slightly, I saw a car stop behind mine, then pull slowly ahead. I recognized it as Novikov's car and believed he had gotten in, so I followed it as I had done countless times before. As usual, we circled slowly around the area. Finally, the car stopped at a street corner on Pennsylvania Avenue. Only then did I see that Novikov was not in the car, but that I had followed a stranger, accompanied by a woman whom I later identified as Mrs. Novikov.

I returned hurriedly to the meeting place and waited, but I had no more company that night, nor did I ever see Novikov again.

The End—Last Attempts

All of us, I believe, were reluctant to concede defeat. One solution appeared to be to call an emergency meeting. When the Air Force could not come up with an item of information urgent enough to justify such a call, I went ahead anyway, and gave the required signal, consisting of white chalk marks on a designated stone wall in the city. In the first few instances, Novikov was out of town, and we persuaded each other that the case had merely become unimportant to him, and that he would meet me again when his schedule permitted

it. Eventually, however, he failed to answer the call even though he was in Washington. It became clear that I could discontinue my trips to 30th and R Streets.

After overcoming the initial letdown, I felt rather happy at the conclusion of what I now considered to have been an impossible assignment. I decided that the future ought to be devoted to my family, where I had sadly neglected my obligations in favor of those I had accepted for the pursuit of the case.

In December 1952, I had the first indication that the case might wind up with arrests and trial, and that I would be required to testify. Although I knew that the guilt of Ponger and Verber could easily be established, I was opposed to another experience which might result in violent attacks on our emotions as well as our reputation. Anyhow, I testified before a Grand Jury and geared myself for the main trial, realizing that it might bring not only tension, but also recognition. This never happened, however; the two suspects confessed and were sentenced to jail terms without my having to testify.*

Comments

In August 1953, when I had become a CIA employee, I expressed my feelings about the entire matter in an in-house memorandum as follows.

> The case is over, and my comments will be short. Ponger and Verber are in jail; Novikov has been expelled; countless others have been questioned; and personnel and case files have been filled with reams of paper. With only a few odds and ends remaining to be settled, my own work is done. I probably should be proud and happy at what I helped to accomplish.
>
> Instead, however, I have to confess, I feel more bitterness than elation, and more disillusionment than pride.
>
> The way the operation was conducted overseas has nothing to do with this. There were shortcomings, of course; but there were also men who lent their understanding, their courage, and their support. Personally I felt, without being told, that my family and I were protected to the best of the government's ability. When it was over, I rode home on what I thought was the crest of a wave of success.
>
> In the United States, I suddenly found a different attitude. I found that an appeal to patriotism could be used as a matter of operational routine, to disguise an arrangement under which an agent trying to penetrate foreign intelligence appeared to be treated according to the same rules as an informer reporting on his neighbor. . . . I found that an informer, like a racehorse, was retained mainly for his usefulness. . . . I found that I had many obligations toward the government, and was often reminded of a combat soldier's sacrifices; but I did not have the protection that soldiers and their dependents are entitled to receive. My own obligations included risking my life, my health, and my ability

*Ponger was sentenced to 5 to 15 years, Verber to 3 to 10. Both men were paroled after serving part of their sentences and returned to Vienna, where they now live as Austrian citizens.

to work; the government's obligations included no consideration of such possibilities. I also found, finally, that the more efforts and sacrifices I offered, the more were taken for granted.

The case itself has probably been concluded with some degree of success. I shall never stop believing, however, that it could have been immeasurably successful if, at some decisive stages, it had been given the benefit of more support, more vision, and more wisdom. For a long time, I had the feeling that I was pursuing the case on my own, supported by nothing but my own personal obsession. I have even asked myself if my fight for recognition and support of the case was not more exhausting and frustrating than my face-to-face encounter with Soviet agents. . . .

The case was finally thrown open for the sake of taking legal and diplomatic action against the suspects; only my own identification was refused in the name of security. And that is where the case now stands, after it has been concluded.

Perhaps everything is exactly the way it should be. I realize that I have not yet gained the emotional distance from the operation that would produce a more factual appraisal and a well-balanced judgment. I hope to have shown, however, that in its various phases the case could have been conducted differently; that it neither had to carry me to the limits of my emotional endurance, nor needed to end short of a more complete accomplishment. Perhaps my experiences can be useful even where they portray failure. I sincerely hope that there is a chance for that, and that someone else may be spared my disappointment.

More than 20 years have passed since I wrote that, and bitterness and passion have indeed given way to reflection and analysis. I now can recognize that my angle of vision could not have been, and can not now be, all-encompassing, and that my views, even after they have become dispassionate, remain personal. With this understanding, a brief examination of the questions I raised in the introduction now is in order.

First, I do not think that I, any more than many others, was sufficiently prepared for the Soviet approach, or sufficiently suspicious. International intrigue of this type appeared to belong to a different world, and to fiction more than to reality; one certainly did not connect one's colleagues and acquaintances with it. This view was surely naive, but hardly exceptional. In the last analysis, it took a rather crude initiative by Verber to jolt me into the realization that he might be part of a conspiracy. Most of us have matured since that early post-World War II period, but I doubt that we have reached a point where we can relax.

Second, It seems to me that at that time our policy in running this operation and others like it suffered from a fragmentation of interests, procedures, and terms of reference. This is no reflection whatsoever on the competence, integrity, and efforts of the several investigative elements; within their own frames of reference, they all worked superbly. For someone attempting to work clandes-

tinely, as a matter of civic responsibility and challenge, to further the interests of the U.S. Government, however, it can be disconcerting to receive the impression that he is dealing less with a government than with a variety of components, each of which may have a different understanding of what, specifically, U.S. interests are, how they should be supported, how he should be put to work, and even how he should be treated. Conversely, it is clear that there has to be room in our society both for police informers, who can help us in preparing for legal battles, and for intelligence operators, who can support us in our struggles for international position and insight; but the two are *not* automatically interchangeable, and confusion of the two concepts can be disillusioning and morale-shattering for those affected. The evidence, as I read it, indicates that the time of the "Major X Affair" we were not in a good position to maintain a consistent and fully coordinated program—for better or for worse—for operations of the kind that mine was—or might have been.

Third, How, if at all, could we have gained more than we did? What would have happened if we had taken more risks, compromised more information, and played for higher stakes? I cannot answer that categorically. No one can. Our additional sacrifices might have brought us no gain. We might have been defeated, with even less success than the operation produced as it ran. On the other hand, if successful, we might have established a functioning penetration of the Soviet espionage system; we might have used it to learn their secrets; we might have led the Soviets to rely on the information furnished by us sufficiently to make deception operations possible.

Which way lay the national interest? The answer is never simple. Other cases may be even more complicated, and the decision more difficult. One thing I know is this: the protection of our security through penetration efforts, in its highest sense, is a tremendously important task, and a tremendously complex one. If properly executed, it demands a sense of discrimination embodying caution and care as well as vision and courage. Those are the ingredients of wisdom. No one, least of all I, can lay down the rules for wisdom. I can only hope that our government will be wise enough for any task at hand, and that in helping to build a secure nation, it can use cement made from experiences like mine.

Another look at double agent deception

MASTERMAN REVISITED

A. V. Knobelspiesse

The advisability that we look more intensively at Sir John Masterman's descriptions of the double agent cases and the operational concepts that inspired World War II deception operations in Europe and the Mediterranean is suggested by recent developments—some happy, some unhappy—that are forcing intelligence, military, and political experts in the United States and in the West to give long overdue professional attention to strategic deception, its recognition, its use, and its counteraction.[1]

To begin with, the coming of the Yom Kippur War early in October 1973 has made the consideration of strategic deception a matter of urgent, current operational concern. Those events will undoubtedly intensify this critical, analogical re-thinking that had already gotten under way about the USSR and Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968.[2]

But more appropriate to our purpose in this journal, it is a fact that more has appeared about deception as an activity in the past two years than at any time before or since World War II. The dearth of significant material to read and study contributed directly to the difficulties of building professional awareness and the skills and cadre to deal with it.

In the last two years we have had a book by the former deputy chief of the deception (Disinformation) component of Czech Security, Major Bittman.[3] There has been a flawed and controversial attempt by Ladislas Farago to recast the professional image of the German Armed Forces intelligence (The Abwehr).[4]

More recently there has been a study of German deception (or maybe more accurately, Stalinist self-deception) in support of the invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, *Codeword Barbarossa* by Dr. Barton Whaley.[5]

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[1] John C. Masterman, *The Double-Cross System in the War of 1939 to 1945* (New Haven, 1972). 203 pp. For a briefer review see *Studies, Vol. XVII/1, p. 80.*

[2] See *Studies, Vol. XIV/1.*

[3] Ladislav Bittman, *The Deception Game,* Czechoslovak Intelligence in Soviet Political Warfare (Syracuse, 1972). 246 pp. *Studies, Vol. XVII/1, p. 42.*

[4] *The Game of the Foxes. The Untold Story of German Espionage in the United States and Great Britain During World War II.* (N.Y. 1972) 696 pp. Farago's treatment is anecdotal, his research extensive rather than intensive, and uncritical. In a number of instances he is the victim of the very deceptions he ascribes to his protagonists. With this precaution, however, the book can be used with profit, particularly for getting at German double agent case data. *Studies, Vol. XVI/3, p. 99.*

[5] (Cambridge, The MIT Press, 1973). 376 pp. *Studies, Vol. XVII/3, p. 17.*

MORI/HRP
from pg.
25-40

There is much in these pieces that one may not agree with, but the important thing is that an open literature on political and military deception now is available, and people can get their minds to it. Masterman's book was the first in this new flow of public literature on deception, and the one that merits the appellation "seminal."

* * *

A good way to begin to appreciate the substantive importance of Masterman's book is to recall an alleged operational story from the early days of World War II.

In the second and revised edition—1967—of Richard Wilmer Rowan's *Secret Service—Thirty-three Centuries of Espionage* (page 606), it is recorded that:

> "Few wartime operations evolved with such foresight and planning as the one brought off by Alfred Wahring. A former German naval captain, Wahring had joined the military sector of the German Secret Service following the First World War and developed a legitimate cover by learning the watchmaker trade in Switzerland. In 1927, at the suggestion of his superiors, he settled in England, identified by his Swiss passport as Albert Oertel. After his British naturalization, the German agent opened a small jewelry shop at Kirkwall in the Orkney Islands, close to Scapa Flow, and filed occasional reports to Berlin describing the movements of the British Home Fleet.
>
> "In October 1939, with the war in its second month, the jeweler known as Albert Oertel filed his most eventful single report: no anti-submarine nets shut off the eastern approach to Scapa Flow. On the night of October 14 a German submarine moved into the channel and sank the giant British battleship *Royal Oak* with torpedoes—a shocking loss Britain could ill afford in the melancholy early weeks." [6]

Some readers may remember this dramatic scoop, launched by Curt Riess in the *Saturday Evening Post* early in 1942.[7] It was a total fabrication, concocted by Riess for sale in a market hungry for spy stories. Canaris' successor, Walter Schellenberg, accepted and even embellished the story in his *Recollections.* Richard Deacon solemnly relates the same details to epitomize the sad plight to the Security Service in his *History of the British Secret Service* (1969) p. 263. And the story has become embedded in numberless other books, articles, monographs, and course lectures.

The Wahring-Oertel yarn typifies the kind of nonsense that has been, and is being, written about intelligence and counterintelligence operations. As a fraud now probably ineradicable, it contrasts starkly with the lean, impersonal, under-

[6] This account was not a part of the first edition of the Rowan book. It was inserted by Robert Deindorfer, who revised and expanded Rowan's original work with World War II material.

[7] Curt Riess, born in Germany in 1902, edited a Berlin tabloid and went to Paris after Hitler came to power. In August 1950 he was involved in the surfacing of a spurious 32-page document purporting to be a draft peace treaty that the Soviets were "ready" to offer to a re-united Germany.

played facts put together about security and counterintelligence in the UK, in 1939 and after, by Masterman which show:

> First, that no German agent dispatched to the UK after the beginning of September 1939 survived or worked except under control;
>
> Second, that the controlled agents were led to elicit and develop data and other indications of intelligence value regarding the status and intent of the German war effort;
>
> Finally, that the controlled agents were used systematically and successfully to deceive, mislead, and misguide their German Intelligence sponsors—the Abwehr—and the military and political apparatus which depended upon German Intelligence.

What appears to be a mercifully short book becomes, when you go into it attentively, something like one of those nested sets of Chinese boxes: there's always, seemingly, another one to explore, and by the time you're through, you've covered a tremendously larger surface than there originally appeared to be. But in compensation, it's worth noting, Masterman's book combines brevity and conciseness with donnish elegance and challenge. Where else do you find words like "parergon," "Danegeld," or "otiose?"

* * *

Who is Masterman? What is his book about? How did this thing get published? Is there anything of interest about the appearance of this book in these times? Why should we be looking at it?

Sir John Cecil Masterman is an octogenarian, retired Oxford historian; successively a don, provost of Worcester College and vice chancellor—the administrative head—of the University. His bent would appear to have been administration and teaching, without concession to the rule of publish-or-perish, because as a historian his production is almost nil. But when one looks deeper, his image takes on that Protean touch expected of the Oxonian intellectual. He has published three detective novels (all, appropriately enough, set in the University) and a five-act play (about Marshal Ney).

His birth in 1891 should have made him eligible for World War I, but in August 1914 he was caught in Berlin as an exchange lecturer and he sat the war out in internment. This must have been galling for a keenly competitive man. He had a Blue in athletics, became an international team leader in hockey and tennis, and whole passages of his book are unintelligible unless you know the equivalents of Babe Ruth and Lou Gehrig . . . in cricket. That's as befits a former president of the Oxfordshire Cricket Club. He is acknowledged as a master gamesman in Stephen Potter's book, *Gamesmanship*. His friends and colleagues are legion; in fact, without them his book could never have seen the light of day. For example, in the XX Committee work he counted as colleagues Colonel Peter Fleming and his brother Ian. The latter's 007 creation—which brought sex into spying, just as TV brought it into the home—is probably known to us all.

So the World War II experience must have been a real reliving for a man of nearly 50, brought out of academia into MI-5, the British Security Service. Characteristically, however, Masterman's *Who's Who* biography covered his WWII career with this masterpiece of understatement: "Major, specially employed."

Masterman's book, superficially, is something like *The Mind of Adolf Hitler*, written by OSS researcher Dr. Walter C. Langer, and now declassified. The two books came out here about the same time. In other words, it's an official wartime document—a secret document of a secret service. It was written between July and September 1945, before Masterman left the service, as a summary of accomplishments. Only 125 copies were printed; 100 were immediately destroyed. Masterman retained Copy No. 3. He made successive efforts—in 1947, in the mid-50's, in the early 60's, and in 1967—to get the text released for publication. He was driven, he has said, by the desire to reflect deserved credit on the intelligence and security professions, which he believed needed it.

The manuscript's bureaucratic meanderings are a story in themselves—not relatable in detail here but interesting nonetheless. From Prime Minister to Foreign Office, to the Home Office, to MI-5 and MI-6 and the Chiefs of Staff, the study was vetted and then revetted. All these authorities agreed to publication at one time or other, but never did all of them agree together.

There were some original solutions designed to contain Masterman's pressure. The last one was an idea to incorporate the study in a larger, projected work about British Intelligence in World War II. Masterman regarded this as a ploy to give him time to die, because he knew that no such work would ever be authoritatively done, at least not in his lifetime. So he immediately went ahead to publish his piece abroad, and with that unerring affinity that binds all birds of a feather, he was placed in touch with the Yale University Press. The rest is a story of how a university press scores a lucrative scoop, for once. And once Masterman's determination was registered in a firm intent to publish abroad, the objections to internal publication evaporated and Her Majesty's Government, taking the better with the bitter, chucked the Official Secrets Act and licensed Yale to include publication in the UK as well as overseas.

It was a real "All's well" ending.

* * *

Masterman's book is described as a book about intelligence in World War II, and the *London Times* judged, "There is no better book than *The Double Cross System* on wartime intelligence." Yet Masterman's book is not exactly just a book "on intelligence." It's really a book about counterintelligence, that part of intelligence work which is concerned about what *other* peoples' spies and spy services are doing to you, using those spies to find other spies, to gain intelligence information, and to deceive the spy masters and those dependent on them. Masterman's book registers the coming-of-age in World War II of counterintelligence as a co-equal professional activity with espionage and political action activity, and in that fact rests its underlying significance.

The book is a statement of a counterintelligence and security service's policy case, as well as the most informative recitation of the theory and practice of its counterintelligence accomplishments.

When it was written, in mid-1945, it must have had a direct meaning for whatever was going on in the reorganization of British Intelligence for the post-war long haul. Note its from-the-guts plea in a really moving final paragraph—moving because Philby was already placed as chief in Section V, MI-6 (the counterintelligence component of S.I.S.) where he could successfully do the most harm. It is a plea for unity of effort between the security and the intelligence services, even if only in the maintenance of common files. And, of course, the plea went unheard . . . until the 70's.

Coming now to the cases, and to the double agent techniques. It seems fair to say, in summary, perhaps they did not affect the course of history profoundly, but the double agent system caught spies, and when placed at the service of deception, it saved lives. And that says a lot.

The codification of operational principles which accompanies Masterman's double agent case facts makes this the only book of its kind in public print. It's actually far and away superior to anything available in the classified literature now being used in our intelligence schools and agencies. It's not just a matter of describing the care and feeding of double agents, but it's in explaining the "why?" of what went on operationally that the book makes its unique contribution. It goes without saying that the case and plan descriptions are important, *per se,* for the narrative reconstruction and interpretation of events in World War II, and they are things you will not find elsewhere, at this stage.

The underlying thrust of the methodological theory and wisdom set out in this book, however successful Philby was at this time in keeping alive the animus between MI-5 and MI-6, apply to any time and to any adversary. It's unfortunate we've had to wait so long for the message to get published.

And that is not all: Masterman in describing the utilization of double agents says more about deception as a professional practice than anything in public or classified print. Yet, on balance, it is necessary to note that this is not the definitive study of deception, either as practiced in WWII or as a set of concepts. Actually, we still need that kind of book.

Simply defined, a double agent is an agent in simultaneous contact with two (or more) intelligence services but working for (or under the control of) only one of them. No case, or few of them, turns out to be so simplistically definable; but this statement fixes the essential element of every double agent case.

The British distinguished a number of categories of double agents in WWII:

a. The classic double who was in personal, physical contact with two (or more) sides during his case—like TRICYCLE or SNOW in Masterman's account. One of the consequences of this predicament is that the double agent is inescapably in control of his own operation for longer or shorter periods. Thus the problem of his honesty, his bona fides, is a critical matter. The classic double is to be distinguished from

b. the double agent who is not in personal physical contact, but uses intermediary communications that are under control (w/t—radio, s/w—secret writing). Both of these categories the British distinguished from

c. the penetration agent, a double who worked solely against other intelligence services to obtain information on their organization, personnel, methods, and operations. And all of these were to be distinguished from

d. the special agent, who was a double used solely for planting information on an enemy service (feeder).

Actually, this nomenclature—probably now archaic—is really the reflection of the evolution of the use to which double agents were put by the British from 1939 to 1945, ranging from the purely defensive early in the war to a very specialized offensive utilization in the last years.

However you define him, the double agent's bona fides—can you trust him?—is the central question before and while he's in contact with another service. A double agent is a condoned channel of communication with the enemy. Putting it that way immediately highlights it as a matter in which law and regard for law are important from the start, and it is clear that the legal aspects obviously require close, specialized and professional military and civilian coordination.

In the United Kingdom in 1939 (and still today), the responsibility for spies and spying activities within the country and the Commonwealth reposed in a Home Office professional organization known as the Security Service or more familiarly, MI-5, which, incidentally, does not have the power of arrest. MI-5 possessed not only the recommendation of legal sanction, but backed it up with the more practical consideration that it also had the necessary manpower to do the job and to do the coordination.

The outcome: after a year of *ad hoc*-ing it through the medium of a board of military service chiefs (the W Board which was set up immediately after the activation of SNOW), the Twenty Committee (XX Committee) was created on 2 January 1941 to do the nuts-and-bolts work of coordinating the build-up, management, and oversight of the DA teams. Nominally, this took place under the continuing oversight of the W Board, which in turn was under the purview of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (See Figure 1 for organization and staffings.)

This system grew and evolved, and not overnight. It was a genial solution to the otherwise impossible-to-manage departmentalization among security components that normally prevails in an open society (including our own). Masterman's book in large part is a log of the XX Committee's work but, most important, the idea itself was communicated to Britain's American ally and that fact has left an idelible mark.

Masterman piloted the XX Committee through meetings on Wednesday and Thursday each week—some 226 meetings in all—until it was disestablished on 10 May 1945. Masterman calls the committee an institutional anomaly—and it probably was—but it worked. Beginning with the 1939-40 accumulation of

W BOARD

Directors of Intelligence and Security

Military Intelligence
Naval Intelligence
Air Intelligence
MI-5 B Division
Home Defense Executive

XX COMMITTEE

Organizational Composition

Chairman: MI-5, Section B 1-a. (Masterman
Secretary: MI-5.
Controller of Deception (as of Aug. 1942, Col. John H. Bevan.)

One Member Each: Military Intelligence.
Naval Intelligence.
Air Intelligence.
MI-5. (Col. T.A."Tar" Robertson, Chief of Section B-la.)
MI 6.
Home Forces.
Home Defense Executive.
CCO (after Dieppe raid.)

MI-5 ORGANIZATION FOR DOUBLE AGENT CONTROL AND MANAGEMENT

CHIEF, MI-5
Sir David Petrie

B DIVISION
(Counterintelligence)
Col. (now Sir)
Dick White

SECTION B-1a
Col. T.A. Robertson
and 2 senior officers
5 Case Officers.
1 W/T Officer.
3, Analysts & Files
Housekeeper.
W/T Operator
2 guards per case.

Fig. 1. The XX Structure.

doubles and controlled enemy agents, the XX Committee ran more than 120 such cases up to 1945.

* * *

Masterman's book contains the bare bones details on 39 cases—about one-third of the total. It takes up, with frustrating lack of detail, about a dozen more. It is clear, however, that these are the most important DA cases, and that the details, though scanty, are true. (This cannot be said about Sefton Delmer, in *The Counterfeit Spy*,[8] and Farago,[9] whose accounts of GARBO, for example, are on the one hand contrived to mislead about identities and contacts, and on the other totally wrong in the identifications.)

Yet this is not saying much, because it's a chore to keep up with the impersonalized volume of Masterman's case detail. The reader is inevitably driven to his own graphic resources. The result is a dandy chart which provides another dimension from which to view Masterman's presentation. (See Figure 2.)

On that kind of spread it's easier to see the evolution of the system, the relative importance of the agents, their longevity, their communications, their sex (their nationality, if one wanted), etc. Even the German Intelligence Service's errors are graphable. Inevitably, the Agents become more familiar and some even stand out:

The Adam Agent—SNOW: he came first. In the late 40's and early 50's, feeder material was called "SNOW" by British counterintelligence personnel and the word was used in stylish conformity by their American colleagues. Now, finally, the reason is clear!

The Mail Order Spy—RAINBOW.

The Classical Sour Double—SUMMER: he led them a merry chase and almost got away.

The Classic Sweet Double—TATE: an extraordinary performance which will be examined in greater detail.

The Ephemeral Double—GANDER: three weeks, short and sweet.

The Continental Playboy Double—TRICYCLE: he brought his whole family into the business.

The Almost Coat-tailed Double—DRAGONFLY.

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[8] (N.Y., 1971), 256 pp. An ill-starred venture, this book is concerned principally with the GARBO operation, to which Delmer refers under an alleged Abwehr cryptonym "CATO," which is not confirmed by the files. There are similar problems with Delmer's other operational identities. *Studies, Vol. XVII/1, p. 80.*

[9] *Op. Cit.*, chapter 50: "Power of Fortitude," pp. 609-29. Farago's identification, at p. 622, of GARBO as Louis Calvo, a Spanish journalist assigned in London under Embassy cover, is totally wrong, and from that point his analysis is downhill. In a reference to "CATO," p. 615, he is apparently unaware of the identity with GARBO. Finally, Farago's index is not a useful guide through his inferno. Apparently the British case nomenclature he obtained in London was jammed into the text but was not indexed. Thus the Masterman book's main case names, starting with GARBO, are briefed at pages 289-90, 620 and elsewhere, but go uncited in the index.

THE XX SYSTEM—SEPT. 1939–MAY 1945



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The Odd Couple—MUTT and JEFF: MUTT blew his top for years as an *authorized* saboteur and JEFF spent the entire time in jail—but had his revenge.

The Half-Life Agent—FATHER: he had an Out system of communication, but no means of getting instructions.

The Parthenogenetic Double—GARBO: The Best Double Agent of them all. Ironically, three times he had been refused recruitment by the British (MI-6) in Madrid and Lisbon. He literally forced his recruitment on the British despite themselves, and turned out to be pure gold. An extraordinarily diligent, self-generating, driving individual; moved by nationalist fervor, he was a Basque.

The Once-A-Crook-Always-A-Crook Double—ZIGZAG: Eddie Chapman—the only German agent dropped *twice* into the UK, but he was a better fraud the first time.[10]

The Built-In Triple Cross Double Agent—METEOR: very, very interesting.

The Double Who Was Only a (Radio) Fist—ROVER.

The periodization of these and the other cases, which have been tag-lined in this summary to tease a reading of the book, is painstakingly developed by Masterman year by year. The cases and the plans can be combined into the following brief scheme:

1. The Phony War Period: September 1939 to mid-summer 1940.

The German intelligence had no reserve assets in place for war; it relied on contacts and agents developed before 1939. MI-5 began DA operations with one of its most productive, SNOW—a Canadian named Johnny Owen—almost in coincidence with the UK's entry into the war. The consequence was the wrap-up of all German agents in place and the foundation of a DA system (SNOW, CHARLIE, BISCUIT, and RAINBOW) which would ensure the detection of new agents.

2. The Operation Sea Lion Phase: Summer 1940 – January 1941.

German intelligence dispatched new agents in anticipation and in support of their projected landing in England, employing parachute drops, sea plane infiltration, and refugee chains.

Forty or more newly prepared agents were dispatched on short-range missions. The German I.S. was clearly on the offensive. The fate of the "Lena" team (Abwehr's Aussenstelle Brussels) is a good model of what happened: in essence, SNOW paid off. (The following details are from sources other than Masterman.)

[10] Chapman was a case officer's heartburn, during and *after* the war. He has told his story very selectively in, Edward Arnold Chapman, *The Eddie Chapman Story* (Julian Messner, New York, 1954), 242 pp., and there has been the inevitable movie.

The "Lena" group consisted of 13 agents—12 men of motley origin, but on the whole brave officers, and one lady. All were dropped in early September in anticipation of the landing deadline.

Six were arrested on arrival, and five of these were executed (Waldberg, van den Kieboom, Meier, Druecke and Waelti). One was imprisoned (Pons). Item: Kieboom and Pons spoke little English; Waldberg not a word.

Number 7 escaped immediate arrest and made his way to London, where he was caught the day he arrived. He handed a Soho waitress food coupons together with his money in payment for a meal. The waitress called the police.

Number 8 also escaped arrest on arrival. But in purchasing a railway ticket to Bristol, which the clerk told him "would be ten and six," he handed over 10 pounds, 6 shillings. And again the police were called.

Number 9 was found dead, a presumed suicide, in a Cambridge AA shelter in November 1940. He had his w/t set still with him.

Number 10 was "Vera"—an attractive lady with pre-war antecedents in the UK and a couple of German Intelligence "friends" (Druecke was one). Vera simply turned herself in to the British authorities on arrival and was not further reported on—Masterman, at least, says nothing about the case.

Number 11 was parachuted on 7 September 1940 into the Manchester ship canal. He drowned.

Number 12 was SUMMER, the Sour.

Number 13 was TATE, the Sweet.

The outcome of the Sea Lion Phase sealed the fate of German positive intelligence operations against the British Isles. By the time it was over, the MI-5 had one of the finest doubles of the war, a not-so-melancholy Dane—TATE. They had added a prestigious continental con man, TRICYCLE, a Yugoslav. SNOW had put "G.W." (Gwellyn Williams) into direct contact with a (neutral) Spanish journalist (Del Pozo) in London, and a case they called DRAGONFLY had been initiated.

The security phase was in effect completed by the achievement of the first five of the operational objectives of the DA system, as spelled out by Masterman.[11] The Security Service had "contained" the German effort; but more, had developed the means to turn that effort back on itself. The organization had grown and was still growing.

[11] *Op. Cit.*, p. 8. There are seven double agent objectives worth engraving in the heads of all intelligencers: 1. Control adversary espionage and by so doing, in effect make him work for you. 2. Identify, neutralize, or suppress new agents and spies. 3. Secure information on the personnel and methods of the adversary service. 4. Secure access to adversary codes and ciphers. 5. Secure indication of the adversary's intention. 6. Lead, divert, or direct the enemy's intentions. 7. Use DAs systematically as deception channels.

3. *The XX Committee Period: 1941 – 1945.* (Created as a subcommittee of the W Board on 2 June 1941.)

1941 – 1942 is a time of organizational shakedown and stabilization. The first experiments take place in deception ("controlled" sabotage by MUTT). Also the first failure occurs: SNOW's net collapsed because of his psychological instability (taking BISCUIT, CELERY, CHARLIE with him), but there are real laughs in this case. GARBO was acquired.

The *latter half of 1942*—This period marks the big shift into active deception. In July 1942 the XX Committee became full-time work, and Eisenhower and Stark were asked to put in officers for liaison. The Consulting Officer of Deception became the power figure in the picture: Colonel John H. Bevan took the job in June 1942. It should be noted there was no deception and cover plan in the Dieppe landing, but this gap was very quickly closed in the organizational changes made immediately after the operation. The North African landings (Torch) (8 November 1942) were covered by a deception plan, the first organizational piece of strategic deception, but still characterized by emphasis on security.

1943—Mincemeat, a contribution to the Sicilian landing (Operation Husky).[12]

1944—Culmination and total concentration on Overlord deception (Plan Fortitude). The key to the deception plan was not that landing was coming, but when, where, and how. Total success.

1945—Marked by the exploitation of the DA system to achieve deception of V-weapons targeting against London and to blunt the submarine effort against the UK.

The essence of XX Committee deception planning was common sense, daring and brain power. The ones that stand out as displays of real brain power (as well as of technical skill) are:

Plan Stiff—Never used, this was a very sophisticated scenario utilizing a drop of agent equipment, including cipher and communication plan, only; no agent. Purpose: to induce a radio playback by enemy

[12] Mincement was one of the operations—along with ZIGZAG (Eddie Chapman) and TREASURE (See Lily Sergeyev, *Secret Service Rendered London* [William Kimber, London 1968] 223 pp.) that had gotten into the public domain before Masterman published. He does not, of course, mention any of these collateral readings, which appeared after he wrote his monograph.

The main work on Operation Mincemeat is by its artificer, Ewen Montagu: *The Man Who Never Was* (Lippincott, Philadelphia & New York, 1963) 160 pp. An entirely fictionalized account appeared earlier, written by the wartime Minister of Information, Alfred Duff Cooper, *Operation Heartbreak* (Viking, New York, 1951). See also Duff Cooper's memoirs, *Old Men Never Forget: The Memoirs of Lord Norwich* (London, 1953).

The significance of Mincemeat has recently been strongly questioned by the retired Wehrmacht General, Walter Warlimont, in a communication to the Irish Defense Journal, *An Cosantoir* (June, 1973). Warlimont explicitly documents the success of the operation in deceiving Hitler, but asserts it did not deceive the German High Command. Montagu, in private correspondence, has taken and documented strong exception to some of Warlimont's claims.

that would positively be known to be such. (This idea still has charm and is worth mulling over.)

Plan Mincemeat—speaks for itself—an operational masterpiece.

SNOW's passing to the German Intelligence Service tainted UK documentation procedures in order to facilitate arrest of the follow-on German agents.

GARBO's notional Liverpool agent, "liquidated" before Torch. (Press notices were actually published of the "death" of this fictional person. The clippings were forwarded to the German and enhanced the credibility in the deception.)

Control of *The V-weapon and rocket* targeting by deception. Elegant. (Notional data indicating short misses were reported over controlled radios and in secret writing to coincide with German knowledge of the impact time of hits.)

An anti-submarine deception, effected by TATE, which closed off 3,000 square miles of the Atlantic approaches to the UK. These are real achievements of human ingenuity.

* * *

It is certain that the day-to-day traffic exchanged with the Germans under XX Committee control is the true creative heritage of Double Cross. Masterman gives none of the agent traffic exchanged with the Germans, perhaps out of a sense of delicacy. But TATE's telegrams are available in the captured German archives. So, though the bones of TATE's case do indeed speak in Masterman's presentation, it is in the traffic that he waxes eloquent, and his case officer, Russell Leigh (who had also handled SNOW) makes himself felt.

TATE's name was Hans Hansen, a Dane, whose mother was a German. (He figures therefore in some records as Schmidt-Hansen.) TATE was the longest-lived double agent in the Double Cross business and he played a big game: perfectly straight for the British; demanding, and insufferably insistent with his Aussenstelle Hamburg control, a Major Karl Ritter, who made Lt. Col. on the case.

TATE logged more than 1,000 Out messages, all under British control. For the 1,000th he received a special Abwehr award—a gold medal, presented after a Blue Ribbon panel of experts, including one member of Abwehr counter-intelligence, had reviewed his traffic and certified him bonafide. (TATE had received the Iron Cross 1st Class six weeks after he had gone on the air in October 1940.)

TATE's message formula mixed hard, factual, but deceptive, reporting with straight-from-the-shoulder four-letter words.[13] Here's a sampling:

"You never let me know what you think of my work. An occasional pat on the back would be welcome. After all, I'm only human."

[13] Message texts are taken from Farago, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 258. There is every reason to accept Farago's reporting of these elements from the German official records.

When asked by Hamburg to report on the quality, price, and taste of a loaf of UK bread: "Don't you have anything more important to ask? It tastes all right."

TATE and his British Case Officer worked the money side of the business—classically the major weakness of all operations into denied areas—until the pips squeaked: "What is delaying the man with the promised money? I am beginning to think that you are full of . . . ."

When he was asked to investigate the quality of British ration card clothing: "You can kiss my . . . ."

In September 1941 TATE asked for the then astronomical sum of £4,000 and unless they paid: "They could go . . . themselves." TATE's German control took the language to be "positive proof" that he was "as genuine as ever."

But no money was forthcoming. TATE then let go of a message *in the clear* that really rocked them: "I . . . on Germany and its whole . . . secret service." Again Major Ritter judged this to be "another characteristic Hansen outburst." And he moved to get the money to TATE . . . by neutral safe hand, thereby blowing the Japanese Assistant Naval Attaché in London; after which TATE radioed: "Won't be reporting for a couple of days, I'm getting drunk tonight."

Scatology aside, it is clear that if the whole of the TATE (and selected other DA) messages could be assembled, the intricacies of operational deception could be reduced to training formats, and cases could be studied and gamed against the baseline of what actually took place. This kind of approach to the problem of building awareness of deception, and of developing skills in dealing with it, is long overdue.

Only one man—A. J. P. Taylor, a fellow Oxonian and, one judges, a sorehead because of administrative slights suffered at Masterman's hand, stood up and spat in Sir John's eye. He wrote (*New York Review of Books*, 10 February 1972):

"Sir John Masterman spent his life teaching history and then became head of an Oxford college. He wrote detective stories and other agreeable trivia . . . this is an enjoyable book, though of no great moment. . . . Sir John Masterman's success was perhaps not as great as he thought in 1945. . . . I'd guess that Double Cross was only the beginning of the game, though I can't say that I have much interest in the operation one way or the other. Like other forms of intelligence and all forms of information, its main value was to keep those engaged in it from any real contact with the war. Just imagine what disasters those in charge of propaganda or spying would have caused if they had commanded tanks instead of words and fighting men instead of double agents."

And Malcolm Muggeridge—himself an MI-6'er in WWII—has it both ways in two places. Once for the *London Observer* (2 April 1972):

"Intelligence agents, in my experience, are even bigger liars than journalists, and in their reports are given to exaggerating their achieve-

ments, as well as the importance of their opposite numbers, in order to magnify the feat of getting the better of them. . . . the manifold strategems and knavish tricks they recount, in my opinion, played little, if any, part in the war's final outcome which would have been pretty much the same if there had been no Abwehr, no MI-5 or MI-6, and no OSS."

But to the *Washington Post* (13 February 1972) he said none of this. He pronounced the book, "serviceable" but "doubted" whether any of the expertise and experience it contained would "be required in any subsequent war."

It remained for the ecumenical touch to wrap it up. A reviewer in *The Commonweal* (8 December 1972):

"If John XXIII was right in declaring that international peace is to be based on mutual trust alone, something will have to be done about this breed of foxes which feeds upon and deliberately sets out to create distrust among men and nations."

Masterman's ultimate nested box encloses his conviction that double agents are the "safest and surest weapon of counterespionage, and the one most easily adaptable to changing conditions, changing problems and even changing enemies." This, written in July 1945, was a sharp eye to what the future would bring with Moscow, and it was a misfortune that the report was buried.

Trevor-Roper fixed on just this point in a masterly presentation (*New York Review*, 30 January 1972):

". . . many of us wondered in 1945, whether counterespionage is not the best method of espionage. For German spies were not only a means of deceiving the enemy about our intentions: they were also a means of discovering his own."

This is significant, and important because Trevor-Roper, too, was in the code-breaking part of things that made it possible to double German agents with surety and certainty.[14]

Ultimately, however, it can be said that the success of Double Cross rested not on the British and their superior wiles, but on the German Intelligence's will to believe: "The German system had a built-in bias toward credulity."[15] All deception takes place in the eye of the perceiver. Unfortunately the eye, as everyone knows, is a very fallible organ. Masterman, in effect, describes how an espionage system with a built-in bias for credulity became a dead duck by 1945. The same fate will befall an intelligence service that repeats the error today.

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[14] This matter of critical importance is outside the scope of this review. For collateral reading, see Farago, *op. cit.*, pp. 196-198, 284. But for the facts, see Gustave Bertrand, *Enigma, ou, La plus grande énigme de la guerre 1939-1945* (Plon, Paris, 1973). Pages 15-97 of this account by the key participant sort out the credits among the British, French, and Poles.

[15] See J. W. M. Thompson, in the *Daily Telegraph*, 13 February 1972.

VIETNAM IN RETROSPECT*

Ellsworth Bunker

I am both complimented and pleased that I should have been invited to speak to this particular assemblage whose membership includes so many friends and former colleagues. I recently spoke to the Senior Seminar of this Agency, informally, and now I am glad of the opportunity to speak to all of you, because now that our part in the war in Vietnam is over perhaps it can be viewed in a more dispassionate manner. I think too there are useful lessons to be learned from our involvement in this the longest—and perhaps the most complex and difficult—war in which we have ever engaged.

One of the lessons which the war taught us again is the fact that a democracy cannot successfully prosecute a war unless the war has public support. Woodrow Wilson found this to be true in my generation's war—World War I—when he saw that our interests were vitally involved long before he could bring the public opinion to this view. So, too, with Roosevelt in World War II who knew that our national interests would require our involvement long before Pearl Harbor made it inevitable. There was little enthusiasm for the Korean War but this, at least, had the endorsement and sanction of the U.N. and thus the support of a large body of world opinion.

As time went on during my sojourn in Saigon I became conscious of the effect a committed journalism can have on the conduct of foreign policy. In Vietnam there was continuously a very large press corps—from 400 to as many as 650 as the fortunes of the struggle, military or political, waxed or waned. I believe its influence undoubtedly was more evident—for good or ill—on the course of events in Vietnam than in any war in which we had been engaged, for this was the first war in which there was no censorship, and the first war fought on television. For the first time the brutalities and horrors which are common to all wars—Vietnam was not an exception—were freely reported in the Press and through TV came into everyone's living room.

Given the fact that newsworthiness is enhanced by the dramatic or sensational, it is not hard to understand the emphasis these received in the reporting of events in Vietnam. For example, a revolutionary land reform program which may have far more effect socially, economically, politically—even ideologically—on the lives of millions of South Vietnamese than the military aspects of the war, goes virtually unnoticed. Thus I think it was difficult here to get a balanced view of the situation in Vietnam. I recognize, of course, that that is not the objective of a committed position and that the country was bitterly divided by the war.

It is clear that the war in Vietnam did not have the kind of public support which other wars had. Americans are an impatient people and as the war dragged

*Text of an address by Ambassador Bunker at CIA Headquarters on 11 December 1973.

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on—in part because of restrictions we imposed on ourselves—support diminished and time ran out. Yet I think the American people did support the President—indeed the election, I believe, demonstrated in fact—in his determination to achieve an honorable settlement of the war. He saw clearly that this was essential to the maintenance of our position as a great power, to the trust of our allies, and to the credibility of our commitments.

This was made the more difficult by the changes which had taken place in the world scene and particularly in the American view of our role in the world since our first involvement during the Kennedy Administration—you will recall his inaugural statement: "Let friend and foe alike know that the American people will take any risk and bear any burden in the defense of freedom"—to the perception today of a more realistic view of the limitations on our capabilities.

I pass over the question whether or not we should have become involved. Strong views are held by proponents and opponents, and I am content to leave the ultimate verdict to history.

Why, you may ask, did this war with a small, weak country last so long, why was it so difficult and complex?

The first, and generalized, answer, I think, is the fact the war was new to the American experience. It differed radically from any other war in which we had ever been engaged. It was both a conventional war and a guerrilla war; a war of aggression and a civil war; a war without front lines; a war in which the enemy could retreat to sanctuaries in Cambodia and Laos to reinforce, reequip, and return to the battle. It was also a political war, a psychological war, an economic war. Because the war was new to the American experience, we had to learn how to fight it as we went along—this took time, and inevitably we made mistakes and misjudgments.

We had viewed it from the beginning as a limited war, fought for limited objectives and therefore with limited resources; and I think by implication we viewed it as limited in time. But I think another lesson that became clear is the fact that a limited war with limited objectives against an adversary whose objectives are unlimited and who possesses, or is provided, the resources to wage unrestrained war is not a viable policy. For a variety of reasons which seemed valid at the time but which in retrospect seem less so, we placed restrictions on the resources we employed and the manner in which we employed them. Had we been willing to do earlier some of the things we actually did late in the war, I believe it could have been materially shortened.

We underestimated, too, the tenacity, discipline, and staying power of both our opponents and our allies—and the Asian fatalistic view of life and death which contributed to their willingness to go on taking casualties at a rate difficult for Westerners to contemplate. Thus in the beginning we overestimated our ability to cope with our adversaries and delayed too long the training of the South Vietnamese forces to take over the full responsibility for their own defense. This was particularly true of the territorial forces—the so-called regional and popular forces. Yet they *were* trained and equipped into an effective fighting force, prepared and willing to take over the defense of their country—as President Thieu stated unequivocally in his speech at the National Press Club last April.

The South Vietnamese people, too, have exhibited tenacity, resourcefulness, and courage. Their country devastated, homes destroyed, children killed or maimed—the Vietnamese people have never abandoned their goal of freedom. Together our two governments have prevented the forcible imposition of Communist rule on South Vietnam, and the program of Vietnamization has provided the people of South Vietnam with the strength to build their own society without outside interference.

I think it is perhaps appropriate that I digress here at the halfway mark of my general remarks on Vietnam to address more specifically several of the points I was asked to cover by your Director of Training, Mr. Rodriguez. He thought you might be particularly interested in hearing my views on the contribution of American intelligence to our overall national effort in Vietnam, and to touch upon my role as the manager of the Country Team and of the several unique programs involving rather extensive coordination among American agencies and the Vietnamese Government. He also asked me to touch upon Southeast Asia in the foreseeable future. This last point I shall leave until the conclusion of my remarks.

I am glad, first of all, to have the opportunity to acknowledge the fact that in all of the posts in which I have served I have found the Agency to be indispensable. I am sure this is true of any Ambassador who has served in a sensitive post. This was especially true in Vietnam.

As it is always good to see ourselves as others see us, I thought that you might be interested in knowing how the Agency is viewed from a Latin American viewpoint. As I have just returned from a trip to Panama, I will read from the transcript of a question-and-answer session which the Army War College recently had with General Omar Torrijos. General Torrijos was asked about the CIA involvement in the political affairs of Latin American countries. He replied:

"Let's be frank. The CIA is not a benevolent institution and is not well looked upon in Latin America, just as you would not look well upon a foreign intelligence agency penetrating the U.S. Here in Panama they act openly. They are people with whom you can speak and talk, considering always that their passports have a different color than ours. In reading the memoires of the war in Vietnam I realized that the CIA was becoming progressive. They are improving the quality and human conditioning of their members. The problems that exist in intelligence agencies are that they get paid information. All paid information is prostituted. Their sources want money and make up information to get it. Our local services get information out of the good will and cooperation of our people. Much of the reason for a lack of knowledge and understanding in the U.S. is that these agencies play around consulting with people who do not know the answers. When I was lieutenant, one agency offered $500 for every Communist who could be identified. In one year 36,000 were discovered. Then, it came to me that we couldn't have more Communists than does Moscow. The sources were more interested in their $500 than they were in the truth." Well, that is one Latin leader's viewpoint.

Getting back to Southeast Asia. During my tenure in Vietnam there was probably the largest Agency representation anywhere in the world—about 600 personnel, which has now been reduced to around 400. The role of the Agency in Vietnam was indispensable, both in waging the war and in the negotiations

leading to a settlement. The relations of Agency personnel with the Government of Vietnam were excellent; they established that element of trust on the part of their Vietnamese counterparts so essential to successful intelligence operations. Their relationships and cooperation with the U.S. military command structure could not have been improved upon. Generally, two Agency officers attended the daily intelligence briefing of the MACV chief of intelligence and the weekly intelligence estimate update to General Westmoreland and later to General Abrams. At these sessions their comments and their analysis of current intelligence were always solicited, and they made a much appreciated contribution.

The valor of Agency personnel, especially during the 1968 Tet offensive, was noteworthy. Three Agency officers were involved in the actual defense of the Embassy when it came under attack on the first night of the offensive, January 31, 1968. They were armed with Berrettas and a snub-nosed .38 pistol—they stood their ground and fought against the Viet Cong armed with automatic weapons.

In II Corps, an Agency official was last seen being led away blindfolded by NVA soldiers, and in the center of Hue in I Corps, an Agency officer was reported to have waited in the hallway of his house with an automatic weapon to stall the searching NVA soldiers, while his associates fled through the garden to safety. He was never seen again. These anecdotes are but a few of the many told about your colleagues during this most difficult and complex war.

As to the contribution of American Intelligence as I saw it, there were two types of primary interest to my day-to-day functions. One was war-related or tactical current intelligence, in which most Ambassadors generally don't become deeply involved. However, obviously for an American Ambassador in Saigon during a hot war, this kind of intelligence became critically important, for without an accurate picture of the enemy's capabilities and intentions, the director of the Country Team could not function. For the most part I was provided this type of information through military intelligence channels augmented by the many Agency reporters scattered throughout the four regions of the country. In general I believe the quality of this basic military intelligence to have been both timely and accurate during the time that I was in Saigon.

Good tactical intelligence was not, of course, enough. In his recent study "Institutional Constraints on U.S.-GVN Performance in Vietnam," Bob Komer commented that "All too little attention was paid by military intelligence to the operational code or tactical style of the enemy and to the fact that his tactics as well as his goals were as much political as military." This may have been true in the beginning, but I think that General Abrams and his successor, General Weyand, were well aware of these factors. It was, however, to the Central Intelligence Agency that I looked for this political intelligence.

I might add that Communists were not, of course, the only target of our political intelligence efforts. The United States commitment in Vietnam was all-embracing. Consequently knowledge concerning internal political and economic developments was of critical importance. We simply couldn't afford unpleasant "surprises." And there were times during the secret peace negotiations when we had as many difficulties with our friends as with our adversaries.

This type of intelligence was crucial in assisting me and the Country Team to make the almost daily serious decisions demanded of us. I must say that with very few exceptions the quality of your colleagues' product—both in the scope of the collection and the astuteness and the timeliness of the analysis—contributed significantly to the decisions which we made—and I hope they were on the plus side.

Obviously in intelligence, like any other field of human endeavor, one is most remembered for one's failures. No one recalls the correct predictions; but they never let you forget your mistakes. In this regard I suppose Tet 1968 has received the most publicity as our "intelligence failure."

Actually I don't believe our intelligence performance in 1968 was that poor. We had good advance warning that some sort of offensive was going to take place over the Tet holidays. There may have been some slowness in appreciating the full scope of what Hanoi was going to undertake, and though the alarm was sounded throughout the country, not all tactical commanders chose to take heed.

The Phoenix progam was another area in which your personnel were deeply involved and though there has been considerable criticism of the program, notably in the press, it contributed substantially to the success of the overall pacification effort in the years after 1968 by assisting in personal identification and population control and the ferretting out of the insidious Viet Cong infrastructure which had for so long fed the flames of the war.

The development of an adquate GVN intelligence service could not have taken place without the very strong contribution made by hundreds of lower-level Central Intelligence Agency operatives. Their patience, their imagination and initiatives and their understanding of the critical necessity of preparing the Vietnamese to develop their own intelligence services to sustain themselves after our departure was all in all a first rate piece of work.

Several critical questions seem to almost pop out of discussions of this nature and we might as well address them now. Was the CIA too operationally oriented in its activities in the Vietnam war and for that matter elsewhere in Southeast Asia? Should the Agency have concentrated only on intelligence collection? I am not sure that I know the answer to these questions. This war was new to our experience, and we had to learn as we went along. Certainly some of your colleagues had misgivings about the Agency's role, and this was reflected in a declining emphasis in such activities in the last several years. Whether or not the Agency is employed in operational roles in future wars—God forbid we have any—I should think the Agency role would be determined only after a sound analysis has been made of intelligence activities during the Vietnam era. The second question which is really an extension of the first—Is it really feasible for a democracy to carry on clandestine operations on the level we did in South Vietnam and in Laos? Given the public criticism and the criticism strongly expressed in the media during the latter years of our war in Southeast Asia one would think that much care would be exercised in coming to a decision to operate in a similar manner in other arenas.

Now, I would like to turn to the present situation in Vietnam and then to future prospects.

By any reasonable measure, the situation is better today than before the January 27 agreement. Our prisoners are home; our forces are disengaged.

On the other hand, the war's fundamental issue remains unresolved: North Vietnam is still determined to gain political power in South Vietnam, by force if necessary; the South Vietnamese Government and the great majority of the South Vietnamese people are still determined to prevent this. Consequently, the climate of mutual trust and goodwill necessary to bring about national reconciliation does not yet exist.

Implementation of the ceasefire agreement has been unsatisfactory because:

Ceasefire violations are numerous, and they have become more serious in the past two months.

Communist obstructionism has prevented ceasefire supervisory bodies from functioning effectively.

There has been no progress toward a political settlement between the Vietnamese parties.

The Communists have not cooperated in resolving the status of our men missing in action.

The North Vietnamese have continued to infiltrate men and materiel into the South, recently increasing this infiltration back to wartime levels. Consequently, the Communists now have at least as many troops as they did in South Vietnam before the 1972 offensive, adequate supplies to support them in an extended campaign, and improved logistic systems and tactical positions.

Most intelligence analysts appear to believe the odds are close to even that the North Vietnamese will undertake a major offensive this dry season (i.e., before June 1974) to achieve their unchanged goal of attaining political power in the South. If the Communists do not attack during that period, they may well do so a year later. I believe the offensive could take two forms:

Massive, coordinated assaults on all fronts, as in 1972; or

A creeping offensive, with gradually increased pressure on weak spots in South Vietnamese defenses, culminating in large-scale assaults against major targets. This option could be the more likely, because it would obscure the question of who is to blame for the renewed fighting, and make a potential U.S. decision to intervene far more difficult. In fact, we could perhaps be seeing the beginning stage of such an offensive now.

I do not want to predict the outcome of such offensives. I am very impressed at the tenacious way in which the South Vietnamese fought against the Communists in 1972. However, relative to the Communists, the South Vietnamese are militarily no stronger now than in 1972, and they now lack the U.S. air support which was a decisive factor in containing the 1972 offensive. Consequently, a return to full-scale hostilities would pose a serious threat to South Vietnam.

Therefore the issue remains. Major military and political provisions of the Paris Agreement have not been implemented, and an extensive North Vietnamese build-up theatens a return to all-out warfare.

However, the U.S. position remains clear. Our objective is to deter a North Vietnamese offensive, and, should deterrence fail, to do everything we legally can to help the South Vietnamese meet it successfully.

Whether there is ultimate peace in Indochina will depend in the final analysis on the three major powers—the U.S., the Soviet Union and China. While I believe that South Vietnam will defend itself against future armed attacks by North Vietnam, and against subversion, clearly it cannot do so if we withdraw our assistance and Russia and China continue to give military and economic aid to Hanoi. The hope, therefore, is that both the Soviets and Chinese have larger interests they wish to pursue with us—interests that go beyond the problem of Indochina—and that together with them we shall be able to exercise on both sides the restraint necessary to induce them to continue the struggle in political terms.

As long as the great powers continue to exercise the restraint they have shown thus far in the ceasefire period, I believe the outlook is for continuation of the current no-war, no-peace situation, with the South Vietnamese Government maintaining its position of relative strength.

Should the North Vietnamese, however, decide to gamble on another major offensive, an entirely new situation would be created, the parameters of which simply cannot be predicted.

Over the longer run, I hope that the process of national reconciliation will at last begin, and true peace, with self-determination, can be brought to these people for whom all too long war has been a way of life. A hopeful development was the signing last September in Laos of the accord setting up a coalition government. In Cambodia the two sides seem to be approaching a balance of forces which may also lead to a somewhat similar accommodation.

The costs of the struggle, in which we were joined, have been huge—in lives, in treasure, in the destruction of homes, people uprooted, in the divisions in our own country. But I believe history will determine that it has not been in in vain. One small country has gained a chance at self-determination. Other nations nearby have gained the time to create a more stable Asia. The U.S. has demonstrated to other nations that it had the will to accept the responsibilities of power and to assure the credibility of its commitments. And the great powers of the world have, through this war, evolved a way to replace confrontation with diplomacy.

The computers close in

CHURCHWAY, SNOOPY, MAD, et al

Morris V. Baxter, Jr., and

Curtiss L. Olson

The seed of much progress is often found to have been planted and nurtured as if by accident. Such was the case in the evolution of computer processing of information in direct support of the missile and space intelligence analysts in CIA.

It was 1959, and the beginning of another in a long series of frustrating weeks for the branch chief responsible for monitoring and evaluating foreign missile test range activities for CIA. Information directly associated with this activity is reported electrically around the clock, and a high volume of teletyped material had accumulated over the weekend. The branch chief now had to scan, sort, and disseminate the basic material to analysts in his branch and other branches of the division.

Interpretation of missile test activity involves consideration of aircraft movements, ship movements and a myriad of miscellaneous kinds of activities for clues to the nature of impending, as well as past, events. Precursors to missile and space launchings fall into rough patterns. Determination of the nature of events often turns on slim circumstantial bits and pieces. The analysts involved in this determination, during those weeks in 1959, were obviously interested in getting all the data they needed quickly. They suffered, however, from a glut of raw information. They had reams of reports. Of the material contained in them, though, little more than 5 to 10 percent at best was relevant. Furthermore, not only were the analysts faced with the problem of high gross volume, but they were also hit by batches of information. This was especially so on Monday mornings, and it was enough to make every Monday blue.

The full impact of the volume aspect is hard to appreciate until it is integrated over time—a long time. The point was soon reached when the analysts had time for only the most cursory examination of the material coming in, particularly when it was in large batches. It was recognized that pertinent reporting was best done continuously, at the rate of the basic flow. But analysts were not on duty 24 hours a day to read each teletype machine output, and compromises were made. Reading panels of various kinds were used to read incoming material against a set of requirements, with limited success. Each analyst on the receiving end got a lot more than he wanted but, more importantly, often did not get what he needed in a timely manner.

So when a staffer walked in, that Monday in 1959, and asked the branch chief: "Do you have any problems that you believe a computer might alleviate?" . . .

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The CHURCHWAY Concept

From little acorns big oaks grow. One simple question posed by an analyst to his branch chief fomented a longer dialogue, many meetings, and discussions at various levels. The challenge was to convince CIA management that they should consider a computer-based system both as a real help for the immediate problem and as the promise for a larger step forward in the broader analytic arena. In August 1960, after several months of study, a proposal was forwarded to the Assistant Director of the Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI) requesting approval in principle "for development of an information correlation system." Approval was soon forthcoming, with the proviso that the contractor be chosen by competitive bidding and that coordination be established with the DD/I Automation Staff.

OSI pursued the matter and Dr. Diane Ramsey, a professional from the Automation Staff, was assigned to work on the project with Mr. Curtiss L. Olson, then Chief of the Test Ranges Branch/Guided Missiles Division/OSI. The goal was to identify all basic processes and functions performed within the branch so as to insure the best response from potential contractors.

At this point, it was decided to formulate a system for processing incoming teletype information. The system was to be open-ended, however, and tailored for us by analysts outside the Test Ranges Branch, as an integral part of the whole job of interpreting missile and space activities. A main consideration was the nature of current and likely future analysis missions in CIA. There were strong reasons to believe that foreign missile and space activity, at least, would continue for a long time, and that there would be a continuing and increasing need for current, rapid, comprehensive and accurate analysis.

In considering the introduction of a computer, it was expected that reliability and efficiency in the area of data retrieval and processing would improve significantly. Clearly the computer, if it worked, would not get bored, no matter how much traffic was pumped through. Finally, there was hope that it could ultimately be made into a total information handling system.

Another factor to consider was that CIA computer programmers and systems analysts are not on duty 24 hours a day. Therefore, the computer system introduced as an integral part of the operation had to be a general-purpose tool designed so that analysts who were not computer specialists could use it. There was also a question of reliability. A computer system processing teletype material would have to work around the clock for days with an extremely small amount of downtime. Furthermore, the system had to be suitable. If care were not taken, the system might be intended for one purpose but designed for another.

Three bidders were selected: International Bussiness Machines Corporation (IBM), Thompson Ramo Wooldridge Inc. (TRW) and Haller-Raymond-Brown/Singer (HRB/Singer). Their previous experience in similar fields, their published documents, and their anticipated abilities to respond to the requirements were the determining criteria. After clearances were obtained, the full scope of the work of OSI's Guided Missiles Division/Test Ranges Branch was disclosed equally to all three. In addition, all were given equal insight into the nature of the problem to be solved. The contractors were asked to submit proposals for evaluation in about a month.

Following a study of these proposals, OSI management and the DD/I Automation Staff concluded that:

> "A man/machine information retrieval and correlation system along the lines specified to the bidders is feasible to fill the needs of intelligence analysis operations."

The TRW proposal appeared to be the most suitable. Consequently, it was recommended that it be accepted and implemented at the earliest practicable date, "but on a phased basis to allow demonstration of the adequacy of the automatic input feature."

On 4 February 1961, the Assistant Director of OSI recommended to the DD/I approval of the project (CHURCHWAY) proposed by TRW, and allocation of $840,000 of FY 61 funds for this project. A contract was proposed with phasing such that only $140,000 for Phase I would be expended if the feasibility of the over-all project could not be demonstrated to the satisfaction of the government. The recommendation wound its way through the DD/I hierarchy and was approved by Mr. Robert Amory, then the DD/I, in April 1961.

The action document for the CHURCHWAY project reached the following conclusions:

> "1) TRW's technical approach to the problem is highly imaginative yet holds a realistic promise of fulfillment.
>
> 2) Project CHURCHWAY, if successful, has broad implications for other aspects of the DD/I data processing picture
>
> 3) TRW should demonstrate to the Agency's satisfaction the technical feasibility of the more advanced aspects of its proposal before the Agency makes final commitment to the entire project, especially, the ability to mechanically process available machine language data into computer usable form."

The contract was let, effective late June 1961, to Ramo-Wooldridge, a division of TRW, of Canoga Park, California. Formally, it addressed two main objectives. First, CHURCHWAY was to demonstrate the feasibility of direct machine processing of teletype data which served as the intelligence information input to the Test Ranges Branch/Guided Missiles Division/OSI. Secondly, it was to further develop and demonstrate techniques of computer-assisted intelligence analysis with display analysis console (DAC), and to train intelligence analysts to use the console. Dr. Don R. Swanson was named the contractor project manager. Mr. Olson was designated CIA project officer.

During the summer and fall of 1961, TRW contract personnel, assisted and advised by personnel from the Test Ranges Branch and the CIA Automatic Data Processing (ADP) Staff (the former Automation Staff), worked both at TRW, Canoga Park, and CIA Headquarters to develop the computer system for separating and distributing raw intelligence reports. Preliminary training of Test Ranges personnel in both computer programming and the DAC operation were included.

By 19 September 1961, Dr. Swanson had made enough progress to be ready to agree to a demonstration of CHURCHWAY. The demonstration was first tentatively scheduled for 9-10 November 1961. Due partly to program-debugging problems and partly to the scheduling problems of CIA officials, the demonstration slipped to 7-8 December 1961.

Meanwhile, on 24 November 1961, TRW submitted a proposal for Phase II of Project CHURCHWAY "to implement an operational capability for an intelligence correlation system." They proposed that $392,769 worth of equipment and $758,023 of systems analysis, application, and programming work be supplied. Additional fees of $109,300 brought the grand total to $1,260,092. All work was to be completed and all equipment delivered, installed, and checked out 14 months from the date of contract.

Then, in a 4 December 1961 *Project CHURCHWAY Phase I Final Report*, TRW described (in 72 pages of text and 63 pages of charts) how the "intelligence correlation" problem might be handled. Later, the principal computer specialists at TRW presented a 25-page amplification in connection with a patent application for an invention entitled Automatic Information Indexing.

Defeat

Those attending the TRW demonstration on 7-8 December included, among others, Mr. Paul A. Borel (then Assistant Director, Office of Central Reference—OCR), Dr. Otto E. Guthe (then Assistant Director, Office of Research and Reports—ORR), Dr. Edward W. Proctor (then Chief, Industrial Division, ORR), Mr. Sidney N. Graybeal (then Chief, Offensive Systems Division—the former Guided Missiles Division), Col. John A. White (former Chief, Guided Missiles Division), and Mr. Joseph Becker (then Chief, CIA ADP Staff). Part of the demonstration was a man-versus-machine separation and distribution exercise. The machine won!

The files are mute on the reaction of Agency officials to the TRW demonstration 7-8 December. There is ample evidence, however, of the response which the Agency's ADP Staff made to the Phase II proposal that TRW continue the CHURCHWAY project. It was largely negative—despite the fact that, in the opinion of the project customers (Guided Missiles Division/OSI), TRW had clearly met the goals set forth for Phase I.

The year 1962 proved to be very frustrating for the proponents of the CHURCHWAY concept. In their minds, they felt that the Agency was obliged to go forward into Phase II now that the feasibility of the scheme had been demonstrated in Phase I. But there were a number of reasons for the ADP Staff's serious reservations:

1. The benefits might be too small to justify the price.

2. A history of earlier experiences with very ambitious computer programs which had bombed out.

3. There was concern that the contractor didn't really understand the Agency's needs all that well.

4. There was further concern that the users didn't have the skills needed to keep the system operating properly after delivery.

Not stated by the ADP Staff, but clearly a major concern, was the fact that the funds needed for Phase II of CHURCHWAY would sop up much of the DD/I's entire ADP budget. The ADP staff was pushing the idea of a single computer center for the DD/I area, to serve the whole DD/I, and to be developed and executed by in-house people over a long period of time. CHURCHWAY did not fit this concept, and they recommended that the project be shelved.

The unwillingness on the part of management to go ahead with Project CHURCHWAY in 1962 was viewed as a betrayal by its proponents. In their eyes, the project had met all the bureaucratic requirements. Yet, all at once, it could not be carried to its logical conclusion. They felt that the reasons given for shelving CHURCHWAY could have been set out as the rationale for disapproving Phase I. Since that did not happen, those reasons no longer had any validity.

Revival

As it turned out, progress was only delayed. This turn of events was due to a combination of fortuitous circumstances. The first of these was the creation, in 1963, of the Directorate of Science and Technology. This new Directorate included managers with a bent toward the use of computers as a tool. The second was the availability of a skilled agency proprietary organization, Science and Engineering, Inc. (SEI), of Waltham, Massachusetts. SEI was being phased out and had considerable funds to expend before its demise. Also, to the credit of the ADP Staff, the door had been left open for TRW to perform some additional work. Consequently, in a report of 100 pages, plus appendices, on 31 August 1963 TRW supplied CIA with rather complete documentation for the computer programs created under Project CHURCHWAY.

The precise date for the revival of the CHURCHWAY concept cannot be pinpointed. Shortly after the formation of the Foreign Missile and Space Analysis Center (FMSAC) within the DD/S&T in early 1964, however a Technical Staff was created. Among other things, this staff took up ADP-related problems for FMSAC, and they were soon working on computer-assisted indexing and dissemination schemes.

In June 1965, their thinking was indirectly reflected in a memorandum prepared by Mr. Olson, who at that time was Chief of FMSAC's Activities Interpretation Division. The Olson memorandum was critical of an undated Technical Staff memorandum entitled: "FMSAC Data Processing Center." In Mr. Olson's view, the Staff's outlook was too narrow. It encompassed only the automatic dissemination aspect of the CHURCHWAY concept and omitted a more important feature—a capability for correlation of intelligence information.

By December 1965, a FMSAC position on the matter had been reached. Also a proposal from SEI had been received and limited work was under way. These facts are reflected in a 23 December 1965 memorandum from Mr. Carl Duckett, then Director/FMSAC, to the DD/S&T:

> "FMSAC has undertaken a program which will result in a computer-assisted information handling system. Discussions have been held on this subject with SEI over the past several months. These discussions have included informal talks with OCS [Office of Computer Services] and

OC [Office of Communications]. On 15 December Dr. Edward Rawson and Mr. Harold Levy presented us with a proposed plan which we believe will meet our near future needs and is basically compatible with longer-term concepts in the information handling and correlation areas. SEI was told to proceed with the first phase of the plan, which is the acquisition and recording of teletype data on magnetic tape. This phase will provide a means for conducting experiments in computer analysis and dissemination of messages. It is anticipated that the system will be in use by March or April 1966.

"The second phase of the program should begin around October 1966. A small computer would be installed in FMSAC as a preprocessor for the acquisition and recording of teletype data. This computer would be used to provide immediate access to recent messages and to send data to OCS. The OCS computer will be used for maintenance of the message file and structured data files such as the present MISTAC [Missile and Space Test Activity] file.

"The final stage would begin with the availability of the time-sharing system on the IBM 360/67 at OCS. This will probably be near the end of calendar year 1967. A remote console will be used in FMSAC to communicate with the large central processor. The preprocessor will still be used to provide 24-hour data acquisition."

This proposal was reviewed at a meeting held on 3 January 1966 with the DD/S&T (Dr. Albert D. Wheelon) and Mr. Becker, then Director/OCS. Mr. Duckett began by describing the proposed system and FMSAC's need for it. He went on to explain that the SEI proposal, if acted upon by the Directorate, would involve a continuing relationship beginning with the present and possibly extending as far as FY-68. During this time, as much as $900,000 of Agency money could be spent. He further explained that part of the system would involve the installation of a small computer in FMSAC, thus getting into areas which normally fall under OCS.

On the last point, Mr. Becker stated that OCS had neither the manpower nor other resources currently on hand to develop and operate the described system. Furthermore, he was in complete agreement on FMSAC's need for such a system. It was therefore agreed that "subject to availability of funds and the further presentation by SEI, FMSAC had approval in principle to entertain a proposal from SEI for the development and implementation of the information processing system."

SNOOPY

The SEI work continued for about 2 years and produced an operating information processing system. This system, as well as its variations and extensions, is generally known as SNOOPY. SNOOPY is pictured at home in the FMSAC (now Office of Weapons Intelligence—OWI) Control Center (see Figure 3), and can be seen in action at any time!

Many of the ideas and much of the documentation for SNOOPY came from CHURCHWAY. The record shows that at least one meeting took place between Dr. Swanson, the former CHURCHWAY project leader, and Mr. Levy, who



Fig. 3. SNOOPY at Home.

headed the project for SEI. At that time (29 September 1966), Mr. Levy stated that Dr. Swanson ". . . remains satisfied with the Selective Dissemination of Information concept as proved by CHURCHWAY, and feels that it is especially valuable as a precursor to further automated text handling. He [Dr. Swanson] approved of our [SEI] innovations in the dissemination programs, and offered one additional suggestion: a statistical routine to record the frequency of usage of terms in the dictionary".

By January of 1967, a number of firm decisions had been reached. Importantly, the Control Data Corporation (CDC) 1700 had been selected as the small on-site central processing unit. An SEI memorandum written then describes ". . . the planned functions of the CDC 1700 system when it is installed at the FMSAC Control Center":

> "The machine will read characters from the nine teletype circuits and store them as continuous text on disk storage. A definite area of storage will be allocated to each circuit. The text will be organized into messages by means of an index, also to be stored on the disk. The computer will use this index to gain access to the text in order to perform required operations and to answer operator requests.
>
> "The index entry for each message will include the following information: message number, time of receipt, disk location for text, and subject codes. The subject codes area can continue results of the 1700's small dictionary look-up and of the IBM 360 dissemination program. Thus, the index entry provides some information about a message and points to the complete text.
>
> " The computer will look up each word in an internal dictionary of about 100 entries in order to detect message boundaries and assign subject categories. Certain words may initiate an alerting function—the operator will be signaled by the bell on the console typewriter and some information will be typed to indicate what kind of message was received. The operator may then view the message by using any one of a number of techniques. . ."

Much important and difficult hardware shakedown and programming work followed. That indispensable effort was performed by personnel from SEI, from FMSAC and OCS, from CDC, and from another contractor, ARIES. The immense amounts of time, energy, and thought that went into solving the many problems were ultimately rewarded, however, and the present system began to operate reliably.

In the Control Center operation, SNOOPY has two functions. The first is the processing of incoming teletype traffic. This is the primary application and always has first priority. The processing program has its own area "in core" and does not share it with other applications. The computer "time shares" in a sense but, since other programs must wait their turn for time in the central processing unit, there is not the degree of equality usually associated with time sharing.

SNOOPY's essential features are that it can:

1) accept electrically transmitted messages directly;
2) scan these messages for words, acronyms, and/or numbers of interest;
3) sort and tag wanted information;
4) reject unwanted messages;
5) display messages on a video screen upon command;
6) print messages per the wishes of the operating analyst;
7) sound an alarm if desired when key messages arrive; and
8) hold a substantial number of current messages (an accumulation of about 18 hours' worth) in the system.

Using SNOOPY, the analyst can delve into the current "library" and look around in it—scan, browse, study it or whatever. Furthermore, he can look at traffic circuit-by-circuit on the video display station. The process is easy. With SNOOPY loaded in the computer, simple instructions are typed on the display station keyboard. To get to the traffic the analyst types IN, for INDEX, followed by a number from 1 to 10 which represents the particular message circuits with which he is working. He then transmits his request to the computer by depressing the SEND key. The immediate response, displayed for his view, is the computer index to the traffic on the circuit of interest. If the display is full, the analyst may command UP followed by the number of digits that will raise the display sufficiently to show him the most recently indexed information.

When the analyst wants to look at any indexed item, he commands the system to search for the item and to display the text. The message traffic from the circuit is then displayed. If the analyst wants a copy of the material, he positions that portion he wants (using the UP-DN routine), types TY for TYPE, and then pushes the SEND key. Immediately, a copy is started on the teletypewriter unit of the 1700 system.

The analyst is then free to go ahead and use the display unit for further "snooping." Using SNOOPY, the analyst can rapidly scan circuit messages sequentially. New analysts do this to check up on the computer to see if it is really registering against every word in the dictionary—and soon learn that it is. The analyst may type NM for NEXT MESSAGE and then push SEND. The next message on the circuit is then displayed. From that point on, the analyst can go through all the rest of the circuit quickly just by repeatedly tapping the SEND key. In so doing, he is merely repeating the existing NM command. If he wants to look at some of the older material, he types PM for PREVIOUS MESSAGE and goes through the same SEND routine.

To switch from one circuit to another is equally simple. If an analyst is on circuit 9 and wants to look at circuit 8 messages beginning where he last looked at that circuit, he types CI 8. The last circuit 8 message he viewed will then be displayed again.

SNOOPY's second function is its use as a general computer. In addition to the traffic processing program, there are 20 or so programs available to the analysts to help them in their job. Some of these programs are important only in that they make the job easier. One is for the tape conversion program necessary for data handling. Another changes the computer into a powerful

desk calculator which lets the analyst perform almost any mathematical operation or function. However, the majority of the programs are related to the analyst function. For example, there is a program which lets the analyst view a plot of radar data. The analyst may see time versus range, azimuth, and elevation data. This program assists in identifying multiple objects from radar reporting and can also be used to edit out outlying data points.

MAD

Representatives of many organizations within and outside of CIA have expressed interest in the CHURCHWAY-SNOOPY concept and its ramifications. One of these organizations, the Central Reference Service (CRS—formerly the Office of Central Reference) of the DD/I, used the FMSAC automatic dissemination program (AID-DISSEM) for experimental purposes during 1969 and 1970 in support of the design of the Machine Assisted Dissemination (MAD) system. MAD developed new computer programs, including ALPHA, a new text-searching and profile look-up system, and TELEMAD, an on-line system that allows disseminators to look at and modify the distribution suggested by the computers. MAD has been used by CRS for CIA Headquarters dissemination of all NSA electrical messages since September 1971, and of all NPIC supplements since April 1972. MAD has since been expanded to accomplish automatic file building for other electrical messages such as Department of Defense electrical Intelligence Reports, State Department telegrams, Military Cables and field traffic of the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS).

The principal difference between MAD and AID-DISSEM, other than the size of MAD and its ability to build message files, is that MAD permits human interaction in the process of dissemination. Messages which cannot be completely disseminated by machine are routed to computer terminals where they are viewed by analysts who can change the computer-suggested dissemination as required.

For several years, as an ancillary duty, FMSAC Control Center personnel copied all messages received onto magnetic tape. These tapes were delivered daily to OCS for processing against a dictionary which reflected the interests of individual analysts in FMSAC, OSI, and the Office of ELINT (OEL). The result was a set of individualized message "packages" tailored to the receiving analysts' expressed requirements. When the MAD system became operational, it took over this function. Both this system and MAD are extremely effective in locating messages of interest. An analyst can state very specific reading requirements and be confident that they will be met. The computer will do only what it is instructed to do—and won't tire.

MAD saves manpower and paper in disseminating, filing, and retrieving the electrical traffic it now handles. This traffic is stored on magnetic tape and is retrievable through the Rapid Search Machine (RSM). MAD has replaced the hectic wire room, which reproduced 21 copies of all incoming messages for dissemination, with a quieter computer room environment that requires no message handling until courier pickup.

In Retrospect

Bringing the CHURCHWAY-SNOOPY-MAD project to fruition was time-consuming and costly in man-hours, money, energy, emotional stress, and strained relations. There was too much optimism when the project began, and too much pessimism when tough problems arose. MAD does appear to be cost-effective. If electrical traffic were not expected to increase in the future, the cost of hardware, programming, etc., might appear excessive when compared with manual handling. But the volume of traffic will undoubtedly rise and create even greater pressure for a faster, more efficient and more reliable data dissemination and retrieval system. Consequently, the writers believe that the ultimate winner in terms of cost and efficiency will be the automated system, and that automatic information correlation will give CIA a new information capability.

In retrospect, the importance of a firm commitment by management is obvious. The Agency might be several years ahead with automatic information correlation, had management had a more thorough understanding of this concept and given greater support during the design and implementation stages of MAD and its predecessors. The fact that the project was developed largely outside the main computer facilities within CIA undoubtedly accounts for some of its problems. But it also shows the value of having enough organizational flexibility to allow significant non-centralized work to proceed. If all important computer work were the sole responsibility of a central computer service, the type of project development discussed in this paper would almost certainly not have occurred.

INTELLIGENCE IN RECENT PUBLIC LITERATURE

ESSENCE OF DECISION: EXPLAINING THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS. By *Graham T. Allison.* (Little, Brown, and Company, Boston, 1971.)

VICTIMS OF GROUPTHINK. By *Irving L. Janis.* (Houghton, Mifflin Company, Boston, 1972.)

Both of these books are about "decision making," a trend of contemporary social and political science that, in Stanley Hoffman's acerbic regard, involves digging around in other people's waste baskets to see who did or said what to whom. Both treat, from different vantage points, the problem of how governments make decisions or shape their behavior on the gravest matters of national security. One is exclusively on the Cuban missile crisis; the other devotes much attention to it. Both have vital lessons for intelligence. Allison's book is about how to understand the decisions and actions of governments; its main aim is to present tools that can improve that understanding. Allison thus speaks directly to the tasks of analysis in most of the intelligence community's production components. Janis, although in search of understanding and better analysis, is really after improvements in policy decision making itself; but his insights into policy decision making have a useful bearing on what we may call intelligence decision making.

Reviewing Allison's book at this time presents the reviewer with a dilemma. Those who have not come into contact with it, now some three years after its publication, must either be little interested in its subject or have no time for reading. They would best be served by a fairly extensive survey of its contents. Those in the intelligence community most directly interested in its message, however, have in all likelihood read it carefully and have already been influenced professionally by it. What they need would be more in the nature of a status report. Neither task can be adequately met in a short review. The dilemma is sharpened by the fact that this reviewer has a strong stake in the popularity of the Allisonian view but remains at heart somewhat ambivalent as to its value.

The Essence of Allison lies in three approaches to understanding government behavior, three conceptual models, as he calls them. The models are composed of the assumptions we use, the questions we ask, the information we seek, the vocabulary we employ; and they shape the answers we get.

Model I is the Rational Actor. It states or, more correctly, implicitly assumes that governments are akin to rational individuals who have values (or cost-benefit calculations), purposes, and an instrumental command of tactics. They establish aims, gather and assess information, weigh risks, then choose and implement a plan of action as an exceedingly sensible man would buy a car or play a hand of poker. If the Rational Actor fails or gets in trouble, it is because he lacked the necessary information, miscalculated, or was lacking in rationality. The noun-verb combinations of this Model are straightforward and familiar: "The USSR seeks . . .", "Moscow has apparently decided . . .", "The Politburo

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believes . . .", "The Russians are now going to . . ." The subject may be plural, but the notion is singular and the action conscious and purposeful. Most important, the all-pervasive assumption is that of a fully reasoned correlation of ends and means, and complete self-control on the part of the actor, the government in question.

Allison's purpose is to challenge the Rational Actor Model "on its home ground"—that of deep international crisis where reason and self-control are at a premium—and trim it down to size as a tool for understanding government behavior. He starts essentially from the realization of any attentive newspaper reader that governments are not really Rational Actors. A government is an assortment of disparate institutions, each with its own preoccupations and habits. Further, a government is an arena in which groups and individuals compete for power and influence. These characteristics of government are as important in shaping government behavior as are rational calculation and purpose, perhaps more so. From them he derives two alternative models to complement the perspective of the Rational Actor.

Model II is called the Organizational Process Model. It is concerned with the role of standard operating procedure of governmental entities in the aggregate behavior of the government they make up. Any member of any organization can understand the power of Model II. Many actions of the organization take place, not because they are sensible or some powerful influence wants it that way, but because that is just the way things are done. Large organizations have to have standard operating procedures to handle important and complex matters or they will lapse into complete paralysis. Moreover, government organizations are created to handle enduring, repetitive missions; they cannot develop new strategies or operational repertoires from scratch in each new instance. Thus, they are usually called into action to do something more or less as they've always done it, and you get the standard operating procedure with minor variations.

Model III is also quite congenial to a layman's view of reality; it is the Governmental or Bureaucratic Politics Model. When you put people into an organization, or little organizations into bigger organizations, you have Politics. People and organizations—"players" in Allisonian terms—compete for status or influence, or perhaps to avoid influence and the risks that go with it. This means struggle, factionalism, even duplicity on the part of the players, the antithesis of what the Rational Actor is supposed to stand for.

The backbone of Allison's book is a series of chapters in which he first introduces the logical or theoretical machinery of his three models along with a précis of their academic antecedents, and then methodically applies them to the history of the Cuban missile crisis to see what they explain about the behavior of the Soviet and American governments in that harrowing event. Both the theoretical and applied chapters are rich in value and thoroughly worth reading. Because he is supplied with an abundance of data, it is the American side of the story, not surprisingly, that shows Models II and III to best effect. In a familiar and poignant episode we see a human confrontation between Model I in the form of Secretary McNamara and CNO Admiral Anderson representing Models II and III. The Secretary wants to know how the CNO

will implement the quarantine to see that it will conform with the carefully calculated strategy of the Administration (Model I). The CNO cites the Manual of Naval Regulations (Model II) and suggests that the matter be left to the Navy (Model III). To Model I's way of thinking, Model II or "how John Paul Jones would have handled it," much less Model III or "leave it to the Navy," just wasn't good enough.

Unfortunately for us, Dr. Allison's *tour de force* falls short precisely where we are most interested—in explaining Soviet behavior. At the outset, Allison poses several key questions about the crisis that he feels have not been satisfactorily answered, two of them about Soviet behavior: Why did the Soviets try the Cuban missile gambit? Why did they pull out of it? In the end, his effort to apply Models II and III are forced and contrived, despite a treatment that is factually largely accurate and carefully done. The main problem, of course, is data. As has been argued persuasively by Messrs. Johnson, Steinbrunner, and Horelick in a study commissioned by CIA (*The Study of Soviet Foreign Policy: A Review of Decision-Theory Related Approaches*, the Rand Corporation, forthcoming), Models II and III, along with other approaches focused on the inner workings of governments, are voracious consumers of detailed information. When that information is lacking, the models do not work well. They turn into largely speculative excursions, worthy of pursuit and inspiring to the imagination, but devoid of reliable explanatory, much less predictive, power. In applying Model III to Soviet behavior in the crisis, Allison explores the role of Khrushchev, his conflicts with other members of the leaderships, and the possible impact of those conflicts on Soviet decisions. Incidentally, while he treats these matters fairly well, he is largely dependent on the research of academic and official analysts who, without the aid of his models, were hot on the scent of Kremlin conflict even during the crisis. But in the end, the theoretical apparatus of Model III does not fill the gaps of absent information.

Allison's efforts to apply Model II to Soviet behavior focus on asserted conflicts between what the Soviets may be presumed to have been seeking in putting the missiles in Cuba and the way they actually went about it. In essence, Allison claims that the Soviets "blew it" because their standard operating procedures for deploying the missiles and associated defenses revealed the move either too early, before the missiles were operational, or too late, when it was very difficult to pull back. In Allison's view, the Soviet authorities in charge, namely the Soviet Rocket Forces (SRF), set about deploying missiles as they always had, in nice identifiable sites, mindless of the need to orchestrate with Soviet diplomacy what the Americans learned and when they learned it.

If "A" for effort is ever warranted, surely it is here. But the result is not quite convincing. As we all know, the SRF can be quite secretive when it wants to be. But Soviet military and political decision makers alike were surely aware that they could start the Cuban move in secret, but they could not keep it a secret from the U.S. Government very long. Why did they think they could go ahead with it when it was discovered in the face of the kind of political pressure that Senator Keating and others were placing on the Kennedy Administration? The reviewer is indebted to Mr. W. P. Southard of CIA and to Mr. Antoliy Gromyko, currently of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs and son of the Soviet Foreign Minister, for a plausible answer to this riddle. Mr. Southard

suggests that the Soviets, knowing they could not keep the secret long into actual deployment, believed that they could count on the U.S. Government to keep it a secret from the public and its political opponents, a not uncharacteristic Soviet expectation repeatedly disappointed, and that the Kennedy Administration was in fact signalling its willingness to let the missiles be deployed. In the weeks preceding the outbreak of the crisis, Kennedy was saying in effect that he knew what was going on in Cuba, that offensive missiles were not there, and "were it otherwise, the gravest issues would arise"—this when it was already "otherwise" and the Soviets thought we knew it. From this they may have concluded that the U.S. would acquiesce in the missile move as long as the Soviets kept it from public view, as would the U.S.

The foregoing may seem farfetched but essentially no more so than Allison's assumption that the Soviet government, not particularly given to light-handed management, would allow the trickiest undertaking since Alamogordo to run on unexamined standard operating procedures. The Southard thesis has gained novel support from the junior Gromyko who, in an article for a Soviet book on international crises, argued that prior to the crisis, Kennedy did not directly challenge the Soviets as to what was going on, and that they were as surprised as the U.S. public when Kennedy threw down the gauntlet in his TV address. Admittedly there must be in this an element of *post hoc* rationalization on behalf of Gromyko senior; but it is not therefore a false view of Soviet perceptions. Which of the two theses fares best under Occam's razor may be left to the reader and future historians. The point is that Model II facts can be made to work just as nicely in a Model I explanation.

In fact, although Allison sets out to challenge him on his own ground, the Rational Actor remains standing astride the history of the Cuban missile crisis like the Jolly Green Giant. Allison has a clear polemical interest in deprecating the power of the Rational Actor Model. Among its offshoots, he accounts the various sub-models called deterrence theory, strategic calculus, or missile power. These he finds inadequate to explain Soviet behavior. But to this reviewer the strategic power approach offers about as good an explanation of Allison's key questions—why they started and stopped the missile gambit—as any available.

Despite the cruciality of strategic issues in the crisis, the Soviet view of these issues preceding and during the crisis has never been fully sorted out in public discussions. From the position of Moscow, or Khrushchev, or the Soviet General Staff, the strategic situation in early 1962 must have appeared positively horrendous. After much ballyhoo, the missile gap had collapsed in one speech by Roswell Gilpatrick; the Soviets had only a few dozen soft and very slow-reacting ICBMs; a small, very vulnerable bomber force; and a rag-tag assortment of missile submarines that the U.S. Navy had under constant trail. Meanwhile, the U.S. had about 100 Atlas and Titan ICBMs by mid-year 1962, a formidable force of 1,500 heavy and medium bombers, and 96 operational Polaris SLBMs. Moreover, it had been toying since McNamara came into the Pentagon with a counterforce doctrine that looked fearfully like a theory of preventive war to the Soviets. This was enunciated in McNamara's Ann Arbor address which not only pronounced counterforce, but implied a U.S. expectation that Soviet retaliation with any small surviving strategic force could be deterred. And finally, Minuteman was coming into the force at what the Soviets must have found a

mind-boggling rate; Penkovsky's contribution from the SRF *Bulletin* of summer 1961 indicates that the Soviets saw this with chilling clarity. In short, the Soviets faced a near future of woeful strategic vulnerability; they knew it and knew we knew it.

What could they do? They could try to change the political relationship. This is what they did after the missile crisis convinced them they had no choice. But in the summer of 1962 Khrushchev, both for Model I and Model III reasons, was not yet willing to scuttle his past tactics of confrontation. The Cuban missile gambit was a cheap and daring way to fix the problem temporarily. Much is made of the probable political value that successful deployment of missiles to Cuba would have had. But it would also have had direct and tangible value in enhancing Soviet deterrence against a surprise attack. For it could have created the kind of synergistic relationship not unlike that existing between U.S. Minuteman ICBMs and bombers today. Facing deployed missiles in Cuba, U.S. strike planners would have to choose between launching a missile attack against the USSR simultaneously and an attack on the Cuban bases or timing a missile attack on the USSR and an attack on Cuba such that they arrived at the same time. In the first tactic, the strike on Cuba would arrive first, and rudimentary communications would allow the Soviets to launch USSR-based systems on warning. In the second, warning of a ballistic missile attack on the USSR might allow some of the Cuban missiles to get off before they were destroyed. In practice, none of this would have worked very well, but simply complicating U.S. operational problems was a plus. And the Cuban missiles could have substantially increased the megatonnage targeted on the U.S. in a preemptive strike.

When the U.S. finally made it clear it would not stand for this, the Soviets had no choice but to back off, for the very same reasons they initiated the missile venture: they were too vulnerable. The sole remaining mystery in this line of reasoning is this: If Khrushchev was so impressed by actual and impending U.S. strength that he would try such a desperate move, how could he believe the U.S. would let him get away with it? Again, the simplest explanation may be the best. After the Bay of Pigs and the Vienna summit, Khrushchev thought he could psych Kennedy out. By inference from the Gromyko essay, he continued to think so until very late in the game. Nobody said the Rational Actor of Model I couldn't make mistakes.

Now where does all this leave us? Several useful lessons emerge from facing the analytical challenges that Allison presents to intelligence analysis:

— A deliberate quest for different perspectives and approaches to explain government behavior is definitely useful, because of the questions raised if not for the answers found.

— Almost all "facts" can be treated in several different ways; and a corollary, there can be facts without intelligence, but not intelligence without facts.

— It is extremely important to be explicit about assumptions and the distinction between logical inference and speculation. Speculation should be promoted but not confused with inference.

> — Finally, on really important matters, it is unfortunately the charge of official intelligence to be more than insightful; it must be right. This requires carrying the methodological excursions of scholars forward to a synthesis that they rarely achieve. When faced with an urgent intelligence problem, it will not do to report that we see a bit of Models I, II, and III plus a few others we might invent. They all have to be put together and the best explanation with the most predictive power derived.

How this is done is indirectly a concern of Janis' *Victims of Groupthink*, provocatively subtitled "A psychological study of foreign policy decisions and fiascoes." The message of this book is simply conveyed: Why do individually wise, able, informed, and dedicated foreign policy decision makers sometimes make some absolutely disastrous decisions and at other times do fairly well? Part of the answer, according to Janis, lies in the pernicious influence of Groupthink. When this syndrome is present and strong, there is bound to be trouble; when absent or controlled, things will turn out better. Groupthink is the purely internal pressure for consensus that is generated by the social dynamics of small, cohesive, deliberative groups of people. It includes the pressure to "get along and go along," the tendency of action groups to idealize their image of themselves and demonize their image of adversaries, the incentives to get difficult things over with, and resistance to scrutiny of biases and assumptions that will challenge the group's cohesion and self-image.

Janis traces the deleterious effect of Groupthink through four modern episodes of national security policy: the Bay of Pigs, U.S. operations in North Korea, Pearl Harbor, and Vietnam. By way of counterpoint to these fiascoes, in his view, he offers examples in which success attended the control or suppression of Groupthink: the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the formulation of the Marshall Plan. The author is particularly attentive to the lessons of the Bay of Pigs and the Cuban Missile Crisis because they were such starkly contrasting performances by essentially the same group of decision makers.

The Bay of Pigs episode stands for Janis as "a perfect fiasco," a failure of collective reason so dramatic as to stagger the imagination. Why did it happen? Why did sensible people drift so uncritically into so wrong-headed an operation? In reviewing the published histories, he finds that key figures in the Kennedy Administration went along even though they felt and expressed reservations which on their face were profound but still were glossed over or ignored. A whole set of wrong assumptions was bought, from the military viability of the plan to the prospects for an anti-Castro revolt. Janis cites four so-called official explanations for this episode employed after the fact by analysts and participants: The Administration had to act on the plan for political reasons; the Administration was new and inexperienced; operational secrecy kept needed expertise out of the deliberations; doubting decision makers did not want to damage their reputations by casting doubt. The author finds all of these wanting for various reasons and goes on to assay how the real villian was Groupthink, the pressure for consensus. It took the guise of an "illusion of invulnerability," and "illusion of unanimity," "suppression of personal doubts," "self-appointed mindguards" and other forms. Few who read Janis' book will attend their next meeting without sensing the demonic presence of Groupthink.

Top level decision making during the Cuban Missile Crisis was a success because it consciously fought the Groupthink phenomenon. It encouraged dissent and repeated review of judgments. It took place in a changing organizational context that obstructed the establishment of set patterns of authority and influence. The President kept out of group deliberations so as not to intimidate subordinates. Fatiguing as it was, decisions were allowed to be reopened. Janis offers in his historical and concluding chapters some interesting views on where and why Groupthink arises. He is not very successful in telling us why in a few happy instances it does *not* arise. With regard to Cuba in 1962, he suggests, almost as an aside, that the threat of nuclear war might have had something to do with it.

From Janis' perspective there are some similarities between policy decision making and intelligence analysis, also a kind of decision making in that it involves a weighing of evidence and then a decision on what judgment to put forward. The lessons derived are also similar: The most important one is to make sure that assumptions are made as explicit as possible and scrutinized with the same rigor as the evidence. The value of this lesson stands out in official reviews of the intelligence community's performance prior to the outbreak of the October Middle East War.

Unfortunately, there are a great variety of "think" syndromes that impair intelligence analysis. Perhaps worst of all is Nothink when the day-to-day hassle prevents recognition of impending problems and thought about them until they are blazing hot. Then there are Bossthink and Bureauthink, hierarchical derivatives of Groupthink, whereby analysts almost unconsciously assimilate the views of superiors and their organizations and drive evidence to fit them. One encounters "I've-seen-it-all-before"-think, a peculiar peril of the experienced analyst in a profession that is obliged to appear, if not be, omniscient. Another one could be called Lobbythink. This occurs when some preferred policy position is being pushed in the guise of intelligence analysis. When the intelligence is clearly linked organizationally with a policy making institution, this syndrome is readily detectable. But it may appear in the most pristine garb of "objectivity" or in a determination to see some objectionable point of view counterbalanced.

Finding a remedy for all these potential maladies is happily not the objective of a book review. But if they are genuine problems, surely part of the solution lies in reflection, an enterprise for which the intelligence profession must allot a good deal of time. A few hours with Allison and Janis couldn't hurt.

FRITZ W. ERMARTH

THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY: FOREIGN POLICY AND DOMESTIC ACTIVITIES. By *Lyman B. Kirkpatrick.* (Hill and Wang, New York, 1973. 212 pp.)

The U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) was born on January 22, 1946. That was the day President Truman wrote a letter establishing the Central Intelligence Group, which joined three other community elements extant at that time: State Intelligence, Army G-2, and ONI. At present, according to the U.S. Air Force Chief Historian—himself now briefly an IC Staff member—there are more than 20 agencies, centers, bureaus and the like, suggesting more an explosion than a communalization.

But the "community" aspect of the IC is in fact forming. One does not sense it in the anecdotal approach taken by Kirkpatrick as he discusses the Bay of Pigs, the Cuban missile crisis, and the Vietnam conflict. It is sensed, rather, in facts that as yet don't make books: President Nixon's establishing the NSC Intelligence Committee, the Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee, and redefining USIB; in the DCI's informing IC attitudes and viewpoints through his "Planning Guidance" and "Perspectives of the Intelligence Environment;" through his directing of the IC production engine with his "Key Intelligence Questions;" and through his hand on the engine throttle with his "Management Objectives."

In sum, the IC is in part environment or frame of mind, in part means and mechanisms, and in part process or interaction. With a certain, modest amount of interlarding of personalities and incidents it might—on second thought—have made a book and an interesting one at that. But the job here is not to review—preview—a book that hasn't been written, but to review one that has been.

And so to that responsibility. First, the relevance of "IC" in the book's title is different from what I referred to above. Earlier last year, as I was coming to work for a different boss, I read several books on intelligence, all of them listed—and many more—in the back of Kirkpatrick's book. Mr. Kirkpatrick's book strikes me as not much different from those I read. In fact, I suspect these books are old friends of Mr. Kirkpatrick's, being as they are on the average 12 to 13 years old. And they are, as his book is, reflective of things as they were, not as they are.

There is an interesting range of chapter titles, and the first chapter sets the flow for the rest of the book. In this, under the heading of "Intelligence Community," five periods in the IC development are distinguished: the period of Cold War initiation, 1947-50; the Korean War with its development of "intelligence-related activities," 1950-53 (Kirkpatrick's quotes); the Eisenhower-Dulles period of consolidation, 1953-1961; the Bay of Pigs and its aftermath, 1961-65; and the Vietnam era, 1965 to the present. No doubt we are in the beginning of a new era, judging by the initiatives of the present DCI and his predecessor.

MORI/HRP from pg. 69-70

Six following chapters go over this historical-personality-oriented basis to consider accountability and control of intelligence; the relationship between intelligence, national policy and policy alternatives; overseas operations, with the emphasis on Vietnam; domestic activities, making clear that such activities are either legal, e.g., by FBI, or peripheral to foreign intelligence, i.e., dealing with administrative matters; support and criticism of the community; and finally a chapter on intelligence in a free society.

Because of the parallelism of the chapters, there is a certain sameness as one goes along: it does not keep the material from being interesting, but only from aggregating into a coherent understanding of the IC. Truth to tell, there is a lot an outsider can learn about the IC from reading what history it has made, who its practitioners were, what the processes are by which it acts. The learning will be from Kirkpatrick's synthesis of high points of his long career in which he has made an impressionistic portrayal of the IC; it will not be from an analysis of those high points—and the foothills and valleys—which then would yield only a pop art plumbing diagram that tells who is doing what to whom.

And finally, there is by now an apparent moderate disappointment that the world still does not know how it really is, i.e., some combination of impression and plumbing.

JOHN MARTIN